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ARTICLES
Unstable Coalitions: Corporate Governance
As a Multi-Player Game*
JOHN C. COFFEE, JR.**
I. INTRODUCTION
This is an article written in honor of Professor Donald Schwartz, a leading
figure in academic corporate law for over two decades, but also a man nearly
unique in his willingness to move beyond corporate law to the general study
of corporate behavior. In this light, this article will not explore the latest
wrinkle in the law-the most recent case, latest SEC ruling, or newest take-
over defense tactic-but will instead ask if there are new ways in which we
should try to talk about corporate law and corporate behavior. These were
questions that Don Schwartz repeatedly asked himself and others, and this
article is a modest attempt to respond by suggesting a different framework
within which we can better understand institutional bargaining inside the
corporation.
Let me begin by describing the prevailing orthodoxy. Scholars of both law
and economics have tended to view corporate governance as largely a princi-
pal/agent relationship.1 Under this view, shareholders are the principals;
management, the agents. While standard economic theory today describes
the corporation as a "series of bargains" or "nexus of contracts" in which
additional interest groups--creditors, employees, suppliers, etc.-also par-
ticipate,2 it still assumes that these other actors will not seek to participate in
* © Copyright John C. Coffee, Jr., 1990.
** Adolf A. Berle Professor of Law, Columbia University Law School. The author wishes to
acknowledge the helpful comments of his colleagues Professors Bernard Black, Jeffrey Gordon, and
Mark Roe, of Professor Richard Shell of the Wharton School, and of participants at Law and
Economic workshops at Stanford Law School and the University of Pennsylvania Law School.
I. I do not mean to suggest that economists view the firm strictly in terms of the principal/agent
relationship. Indeed, the earliest economic theorists viewed the firm as a production function, and
proponents ofrore recent "transaction cost" models have theorized about the boundaries of the
firm. For an overview of all these theories, see Hart, An Economist's Perspective On The Theory Of
The Firm, 89 COLUM. L. REv. 1757 (1989). My point is rather that the problem of internal govern-
ance has been viewed by economists largely as a principal/agent problem. See, e.g., id. at 1758-60;
Holmstrom, Moral Hazard and Observability, 10 BELL J. ECON. 74 (1979). Such theories tend to
overlook the degree to which other actors can influence or form alliances with the agent.
2. For standard accounts, see Fama, Agency Problems and the Theory of the Firm, 88 J. POL.
ECON. 288 (1980); Jensen & Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and
Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305 (1976).
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governance decisions. Under the neoclassical view, efficiency dictates that
only the firm's residual claimants-its shareholders-should have voting
rights. 3 As a result, corporate governance (although not the broader topic of
corporate contracting) essentially boils down to the principal/agent relation-
ship between shareholders and managers. So viewed, the law's role becomes
that of reducing the "agency costs" that shareholders must incur to hold
management faithful to their interests.
The thesis of this article is that this bilateral model of corporate govern-
ance oversimplifies, basically because it leaves out an essential third player:
stakeholders. Although stakeholders have not in the past sought to partici-
pate in corporate governance, this pattern is changing-only recently, to be
sure, but very rapidly in some sectors of the economy. In some cases, the
motor force driving this change may be the failure of an earlier system of
implicit contracting; in other cases, it may be an exogenous change (such as
the development of junk bonds) that revealed the inadequacy of existing con-
tractual protections and left stakeholders exposed to new risks. In response,
new contractual protections have been designed to protect some stakehold-
ers, but other stakeholders have sought instead to participate in governance
decisions. The key transition, however, is the formation of coalitions-some-
times between management and stakeholders to resist shareholder pressures
and sometimes between stakeholders and shareholders to oust management.
The central concern of this article will be where this transition is leading.
Arguably, the public corporation should be viewed less as a "series of bar-
gains" than as a "series of coalitions." Compared to bargains, coalitions are
less stable, less enforceable, and less predictable. While the "nexus of con-
tracts" paradigm conveys, at least rhetorically, the view that the relation-
ships among those interacting within the corporation are fixed and
enforceable, the reality may be that these relationships are more fluid and
transitional, with outcomes determined less on the basis of legal rights than
through coalition politics.
Because coalitions tend to be short-lived, one implication of this view is
that the locus of power and authority within the corporation is less certain,
and control shifts more predictable, than traditional theory implies. Some
instability is inherent because ex post enforcement is seldom possible, and
hence alliances last only as long as it is in the parties' mutual self-interest to
remain allied. Once we recognize that there are at least three essential play-
ers in the game of corporate governance-management, shareholders, and
stakeholders-it follows that the simple principal/agent model of corporate
governance no longer represents an adequate descriptive or "positive" model.
3. See Easterbrook & Fischel, Voting in Corporate Law, 26 J.L. & ECON. 395, 403-06 (1983)
(arguing on grounds of efficiency that because only residual equity owners have an overall interest
in a firm's profitability, only they should possess voting rights).
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Put simply, once stakeholders are introduced into the game as a third player,
management, although nominally an "agent" of the shareholders, may find
ways to avoid being accountable to its principal by entering into contractual
arrangements with stakeholders that effectively shelter ifianagement. Some-
times such arrangements may represent simple collusion by which manage-
ment bribes the stakeholders (with the shareholders' funds) to support it
against its principal. Other times they may represent an efficient, if implicit,
system for protecting stakeholders against risks when contracting is too
costly.4 In any event, what is clear is that in a three-sided game, any two
players can form a coalition against the third, and outcomes thus become
indeterminate. 5
So what? The conclusion that outcomes are often indeterminate may seem
remarkably weak, but it leads to a methodological critique of some import-
ance. Neoclassical economists have tended to view the corporation as an
equilibrium position; that is, from the standard "nexus of contracts" perspec-
tive, the corporation is not an entity but rather the residue of a series of
bargains in the relevant financial and managerial markets among those sup-
plying the factors of production. 6 This perspective ignores the possibility of
continuing, or at least recurring, disequilibrium. In contrast, from a game
theory perspective, one can describe conditions under which such dise-
quilibrium is predictable. A purpose of this article is to explore this game
theory perspective as it could apply to bargaining among internal corporate
constituencies. Unfortunately, the problem with game theory as an analytic
tool is that those using it have sometimes tended to abstract the issues under
consideration to a level of generality at which all sight is lost of relevant
institutional detail. As a result, this article will first focus on the new charac-
ter of the bargaining within the firm and only later suggest a theory of when
and why such bargaining may fail.
A game theory approach to corporate governance will sound fanciful to
4. Under this view, the board (management) is not an agent, but a neutral referee that balances
the interests of different constituencies within the corporation. For a consideration of this view,
which probably is consistent with directors' own perceptions of their roles but which raises serious
issues of accountability, see Coffee, Shareholders Versus Managers: The Strain in the Corporate
Web, 85 MIcH. L. REv. 1, 81-86 (1986).
5. I recognize that there are also persons external to the corporate "nexus of contracts" with
whom management may collude, such as the proverbial "white knight" or "white squire." For
example, one arguably can view the recent battle among Time, Warner, and Paramount as a case
that at bottom involved a conflict between Time's shareholders, who wished to accept a takeover
premium, and its management who wished to avoid ouster. From this perspective, one can view
Time's top dollar offer for Warner plus its more than generous employment arrangements with
Warner's senior executives as collusion between management and an external ally. See Hilder,
Warner Employees to Get Record Total Of $677 Million if Time Deal is Approved, Wall St. J., July
24, 1989, at A4, col. 2.
6. See Jensen & Meckling, supra note 2, at 311.
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some.7 As recently as a decade ago, actual examples of coalitional bargain-
ing would have been difficult to find. Yet, two developments make its focus
on flux, rather than equilibrium, increasingly important. First, the magni-
tude of the collective action problems that historically have kept sharehold-
ers from uniting to engage in negotiations with management has shrunk
dramatically with the rise of institutional share ownership.8 As a result, bar-
gaining between shareholders and other groups (management, unions, credi-
tors, etc.) is now more feasible, even if still unusual. Second, stakeholders
have new reason to bargain, because they have found themselves exposed to
adverse wealth transfers caused by takeovers and leveraged buyouts (LBOs).
Put simply, at least some of the gains received by target shareholders in take-
overs have come at the expense of creditors and employees. 9 The extent of
such wealth transfers is in serious dispute, and most doubt that they account
for the greater part of the target shareholders' gains.' 0 Still, the critical point
is that as the takeover market has changed, stakeholders have begun to par-
ticipate in corporate control contests, and they seem likely to do so with even
greater frequency in the future.
The organizational form of the public corporation has experienced new
stresses as the result of developments in the takeover market, and some have
even predicted its demise." Like reports of Mark Twain's death, such pre-
dictions seem premature, but as some of the contracting parties experience
recurrent losses, they will predictably search for new contractual or institu-
tional protections. Evidence of such a search is abundant. Over the last
three years, new forms of bargaining and new institutional arrangements
have become visible: LBOs, employee stock ownership plans (ESOPs),
poison puts, and union-led takeovers are all examples. This article will con-
sider the different ways in which this bargaining could play out.
An assessment of the judicial role is necessarily involved in this evaluation.
7. Nonetheless, respected economists have used it to analyze other kinds of bargaining within the
firm. See M. AOKI, THE CO-OPERATIVE GAME THEORY OF THE FIRM (1984); Leibenstein, The
Prisoner's Dilemma in the Invisible Hand: An Analysis of Intrafirm Productivity, 72 AM. ECON.
REV. 92 (Papers & Proceedings, May 1982).
8. See infra notes 180-182 and accompanying text.
9. See, e.g., Coffee, supra note 4, at 68-71; Shleifer & Summers, Breach of Trust in Hostile Take-
overs, in CORPORATE TAKEOVERS: CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES 33 (A. Auerbach ed. 1988). Re-
cent evidence on bondholders' losses in takeovers provides some additional support for this wealth
transfer hypothesis. See infra notes 70-80 and accompanying text.
10. See Lehn & Poulsen, Leveraged Buyouts: Wealth Created or Wealth Redistributed?, in PUB-
LIC POLICY TOWARD CORPORATE TAKEOVERS 46 (M. Weidenbaum & K. Chilton ed. 1988) (argu-
ing that wealth transfers from creditors and preferred shareholders to common shareholders is not
great enough to require a public policy remedy). For an estimate that shareholder gains from take-
overs and restructurings between 1981 and 1986 amounted to $162 billion, see Black & Grundfest,
Shareholder Gains from Takeovers and Restructurings Between 1981 and 1986: $162 Billion Is A Lot
of Money, 1 J. APPLIED CORP. FIN. 5 (1988).
11. See Jensen, Eclipse of the Public Corporation, HARV. BUS. REV., Sept.- Oct. 1989, at 61.
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To what extent are courts competent to resolve or monitor these disputes?
What new problems will they face? One should not assume, however, that
legal forces will be decisive. Courts are not necessarily at stage center in this
process, and legal rules that attempt to preclude collusion may only compli-
cate the bargaining process by locking the parties into a familiar problem
known to game theorists as the "Prisoner's Dilemma."1 2 New market forces
and mechanisms are emerging, and the growing "institutionalization" of the
stock market may prove to be the force that most profoundly changes the
nature of the bargaining within the firm. In assessing the interplay of these
forces, this article will seek more to provide a positive account than a norma-
tive critique of the firm. Nevertheless, the recognition that changes are oc-
curring in what is happening inevitably sets. the stage to reconsider what
ought to happen, and a preliminary normative evaluation will be offered in
the concluding section.
II. INTERNAL CONTRACTING AND THE MODERN HISTORY OF THE FIRM
Before proceeding further, some terms need to be defined. "Stakeholder"
is a deliberately ambiguous term, which includes a variety of subgroups
whose interests can often conflict.13 The two largest constituents in this
amorphous category are creditors and employees. Their relative exposure to
loss and ability to bargain collectively with management differ greatly, but
one factor that unites them is a long-term interest in the firm's solvency.
This implies a preference that the firm retain or reinvest much of its "free
cash flow." Free cash flow is a term coined by Professor Michael Jensen to
refer to those discretionary cash flows that remain once the firm makes the
required payments to creditors and other fixed-interest claimants.14 In con-
trast to stakeholders, shareholders tend to regard free cash flow as subop-
timally invested capital, which they wish to have returned to them. This is
exactly what restructurings, leveraged buyouts,. and bust-up takeovers do,
thus explaining why stakeholders and shareholders view such transactions
from opposing perspectives.
Jensen's focus on free cash flow and his concomitant recognition that a
significant conflict of interest could arise between shareholders and managers
over its use is a significant concession that shows a new consensus developing
among theorists of the firm. In a sense, it brings us full circle. For a genera-
12. The Prisoner's Dilemma game and its application to corporate coalitions is discussed more
fully infra at Part V.
13. The possibility-indeed probability-of conflict among the stakeholders is examined infra at
Part V. In the interim, this article will use the heroically simplifying assumption that stakeholders
have relatively homogenous preferences vis-a-vis management.
14. See Jensen, Agency Costs of Free Cash Flow, Corporate Finance, and Takeovers, 76 AM.
ECON. REv. 323, 323 (Papers & Proceedings, May 1986).
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tion, a number of economic and business scholars-including William
Baumol, Robin Marris, Oliver Williamson, and Merritt Fox-have expressed
the view that management has an innate preference for empire building, asset
retention, and cash hoarding. 15 These writers, often called the "Managerial-
ists," have tended to disagree with more neoclassical economists, who be-
lieved that either the market or internal contracting within the firm would
suffice to discipline any such frolics and detours by management. Free cash
flow theory also disagrees with the neoclassical theory in hypothesizing that
management tends to hoard discretionary (or "free") cash flows, reinvesting
them in unprofitable acquisitions or internal expansion instead of paying
them out to shareholders in the form of dividends or other distributions.16 In
this light, the free cash flow theory is only a reinterpretation of the Manageri-
alists' original view that corporate managements are biased toward empire
building; as a theory, it at once concedes the accuracy of the Managerialists'
diagnosis but pronounces the problem largely solved by the advent of the
bust-up, or financially motivated, takeover.
17
Still, the free cash flow theory never answers the key question: why is
management so biased toward inefficient growth and retention of cash flows?
Originally, the Managerialists focused on the psychic income and security
that growth and large size afforded management.18 Professor Williamson
also theorized that management had an "expense preference." 19 More re-
15. For some of the better known works in this vein, see W. BAUMOL, BUSINESS BEHAVIOR,
VALUE AND GROWTH (1959); M. Fox, FINANCE AND INDUSTRIAL PERFORMANCE IN A DY-
NAMIC ECONOMY: THEORY, PRACTICE, AND POLICY (1987); R. MARRIS, THE ECONOMIC THE-
ORY OF 'MANAGERIAL' CAPITALISM (1964); Williamson, Managerial Discretion and Business
Behavior, 53 AM. EON. REV. 1032 (1963). For an overview of this tradition, see Coffee, supra note
4, at 20-21, 28-31.
16. See Jensen, supra note 14, at 323.
17. A "bust-up" takeover involves the acquisition of a corporation for purposes of liquidation.
The acquiror hopes to realize a premium in the spread between the liquidation value and acquisition
price. See Coffee, supra note 4, at 2-4.
Today, virtually all close observers of the takeover scene recognize that takeovers have spurred a
massive "deconglomeration" movement that is pruning overgrown corporate empires and reshaping
the size and scope of the American industrial corporation. The appearance of the bust-up takeover
in the 1980s has demonstrated that many, if not most, publicly held firms trade in the stock market
at a significant discount off their liquidation values. In effect, bust-up takeovers arbitrage this
spread between stock market and liquidation values. See id. at 3-5. What explains the spread
between these two values? For an overview of the various theories that seek to explain the motives
for takeovers, see Kraakman, Taking Discounts Seriously: The Implications of "Discounted" Share
Prices as an Acquisition Motive, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 891, 892-901 (1988). Today, almost no theo-
rists continue to subscribe to "information" theories under which the target company is seen as
undervalued by the market. Id. at 898-901.
18. See, e.g., R. GORDON, BUSINESS LEADERSHIP IN THE LARGE CORPORATION 305-06, 311
(1945); R. MARRIS, supra note 15, at 61-66.
19. See Williamson, supra note 15, at 1034-36 (management prefers certain costs that generate
value above productivity, including costs for staff expenditures, special managerial salaries, and
funds for discretionary investment).
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cently, Professor Jensen may have come closer to the mark by focusing on
problems in executive compensation that may give executives inadequate in-
centive to accept risk or maximize the return-on assets (instead of seeking to
maximize corporate size). 20 Yet neither hypothesis explains why the dis-
count between going-concern and bust-up values can reach the magnitude
sufficient to justify takeover premiums that now average nearly fifty percent.
Thus, let me introduce a third possibility: the much discussed managerial
preference for earnings retention and growth may be partially explained as
the product of an implicit bargain with stakeholders. Just as aberrations in
the planetary orbit of a distant planet may be explained by the weak gravita-
tional force of an even more remote, hidden planet, so may the seeming infi-
delity of management to the goal of shareholder wealth maximization be
explained to some degree by the hidden pull of stakeholders. To be sure,
stakeholders may not have approved of the waste and expense preference
behavior that the Managerialists saw during the pretakeover era, but they did
support management's policy of earnings reinvestment. Directors, in turn,
defined their role as that of balancing the interests of these different constitu-
encies, and so they became the force that, prior at least to the dominance of
the hostile takeover, held the implicit bargain in place.2'
Why were stakeholders this interested in free cash flow? Creditors and
employees have common reasons to resist the shareholders' desire to drain
the firm of its free cash flow. Employees have "firm specific" human capital
invested in the firm, and a policy of expansioh through acquisitions and in-
ternal growth (even if inefficient) increases their opportunities for promotion
and advancement within the firm. For long-term creditors, any increase in
the firm's debt/equity ratio reduces their security. Acquisitions, in contrast,
may have a co-insurance effect that decreases the variability of the firm's cash
20. See Baker, Jensen & Murphy, Compensation and Incentives: Practice vs Theory, 43 J. FIN.
593, 600-09 (1988); M. JENSEN & K. MURPHY, PERFORMANCE PAY AND TOP MANAGEMENT
INCENTIVES, (Harvard Business School Working Paper No. 88-059, 1988); see also Note, The Exec-
utive Compensation Contract: Creating Incentives to Reduce Agency Costs, 37 STAN. L. REV. 1147,
1155-60 (1985) (by G. Rehnert) (arguing in favor of executive compensation based upon "relative
market price" or value of firm's shares directly attributable to CEO's performance).
21. Some decisions have in fact defined the board's fiduciary responsibility to be to "deal fairly
and even-handedly with both the protection of investors, on the one hand, and the legitimate con-
cerns and interests of employees and management of a corporation who service the interests of
investors, on the other [hand]." GAF Corp. v. Union Carbide Corp., 624 F. Supp. 1016, 1020
(S.D.N.Y. 1985). But see Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 182-
84 (Del. 1986) (rejecting view that board should consider interests of non-shareholder constituen-
cies when sale of corporation is inevitable). In this article's terminology, the Revlon view that the
board may not protect the interests of these other constituencies may have left boards exposed to
unanticipated risks and hence eager to develop coalitions. For the empirical observation that senior
management sees its chief loyalty to be to employees, not shareholders, see G. DONALDSON, MAN-
AGING CORPORATE WEALTH: THE OPERATION OF A COMPREHENSIVE FINANCIAL GOALS SYS-
TEM 155-56 (1984).
1990] 1501
THE GEORGETOWN LAW JOURNAL
flow and thereby creates value for bondholders, even if the acquisition is
debt-financed.
22
This story of a happy collusion between stakeholders and target manage-
ment to retain free cash flow in the firm came to an abrupt halt in the early
1980s with the dawn of bust-up takeovers. Target managements suddenly
faced a choice between increasing leverage or becoming vulnerable to a hos-
tile takeover. Bondholders, who had grown accustomed to a managerial dis-
taste for leverage, were suddenly surprised by a change in managerial
preferences that left them exposed and unprotected. Yet, before this story
can supply a normative argument that justifies judicial protection for bond-
holders, one must explain why stakeholders did not protect themselves con-
tractually. In theory, employees could have negotiated employment
contracts (or "golden parachutes") that promised them employment secur-
ity; similarly, creditors could have negotiated negative covenants in their
loan agreements that restricted the firm's ability to increase leverage through
acquisitions, financial restructuring, or large scale dividends.
Different explanations can be given for why stakeholders failed to secure
these contractual protections. Neoclassical financial economists have a sim-
ple answer to this question: stakeholders in effect accepted the risk in ex-
change for a higher return. In the case of creditors, for example, they argue
that bondholders, being rational actors, discounted the risk of expropriation
through wealth-transferring restructurings and accepted a higher interest
rate to compensate them for'bearing this risk. Hence, this argument con-
cludes, bondholders cannot complain of unfairness when a firm subsequently
restructures in a manner that adversely affects them, because this right to
issue additional debt was bargained for by the shareholders through their
agents, the management. Although courts have not yet faced hard cases in
which management has used a discretionary power opportunistically, they
have to date uniformly ruled against bondholders in circumstances in which
the indenture did not restrict the issuance of additional debt.23
22. For a discussion of this point, see D. COOK & J. MARTIN, THE CO-INSURANCE AND LEVER-
AGE EFFEcTs ON TARGET-FIRM BONDHOLDER WEALTH (Working Paper, Nov. 1988) (copy on file
at The Georgetown Law Journal).
23. See Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. RJR Nabisco, Inc., 716 F. Supp. 1504, 1507-08 (S.D.N.Y.
1989) (rejecting claim by large bondholder that leveraged buyout of issuer breached either fiduciary
duty of good faith or fair dealing); Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. Federated Dep't Stores, Inc., 723 F.
Supp. 976, 990-93 (S.D.N.Y. 1989) (finding, in part, no breach of good faith or fair dealing when
merger devalued debentures issued before transaction because indenture explicitly permitted merger
and assumption of additional debt); cf. Harris Trust & Say. Bank v. E-II Holdings, Inc., No. 89-
C203 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 13, 1989) (LEXIS, Genfed. library, Dist file) (upholding dismissal of trustee's
request for declaration of its rights to information from defendant on whether acquisitions and
transactions were within terms of Note Indenture and Trust Act of 1939). For the general view of
the Delaware courts that issuers do not owe bondholders a fiduciary duty, see Simons v. Cogan, 549
A.2d 300, 303-04 (Del. 1988) (corporate directors do not owe fiduciary duty to holders of converti-
[Vol. 78:14951502
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Nonetheless, the claim that what was not prohibited was therefore permit-
ted is too neat, tidy, and simplistic. The major puzzle is why rational inves-
tors would purchase investment grade debt, and thereby accept the interest
rate penalty applicable to such supposedly secure obligations, when this
would leave them seriously exposed to risks in the control of an adverse party
(i.e., the debtor). Although it is certainly conceivable that some investors
would take this risk (for example, junk bond investors), the curious irony is
that the class of bondholders who have suffered the most from LBOs and
bond rating downgradings has been those who are the most risk averse-
namely, the purchasers of senior investment grade bonds.2 4 Why is it that
those most likely to have feared the risk have suffered most from it?
Possible answers include: (1) that the risk was so unexpected or of such a
low probability that it was impossible or too costly to protect against (much
as it makes little sense to buy earthquake insurance in Florida); (2) that the
risk was one that stakeholders believed the law already protected them
against; and (3) that, although they understood they were legally exposed,
stakeholders relied either on an implicit bargain that management would not
exploit such loopholes or, more generally, on management's reputation for
acting in good faith and in accordance with prevailing business standards
and expectations. The second possibility that stakeholders mistakenly as-
sumed they were protected (much as homeowners may misinterpret their in-
surance policies) deserves special attention because it raises the possibility of
informational or market failure.
A. LEGAL PROTECTIONS FOR INCOMPLETE CONTRACTS
In overview, there are at least three theories potentially available to bond-
holders when the indenture does not clearly permit the issuance of additional
debt: (1) they can claim that there is an omission in the contract that the
court should fill in by determining what rational parties would have in-
tended;25 (2) they can assert that the issuer breached a duty of good faith,
which is a mandatory term in all contracts;26 or (3) they can argue that the
ble debentures because such holders have no equitable interest in the corporation and are protected
by terms of the indenture). For a further discussion of these cases, see infra text accompanying
notes 38-48.
24. For such a finding, see A. Warga & I. Welch, Bondholder Losses in Leveraged Buyouts 13
(tent. draft Dec. 1989) (revised draft released May 1990) (copy on file at The Georgetown Law
Journal).
25. See generally Farnsworth, Disputes Over Omissions In Contracts, 68 COLUM. L. REV. 860
(1968).
26. The duty of good faith is a universal, nonwaivable element of contract law, which applies
equally to bond indentures and to other contracts. See Burton, Breach of Contract and the Common
Law Duty to Perform in Good Faith, 94 HARV. L. REv. 369,-369 (1980). For cases in which courts
have refused to let issuers exploit bondholders even though the issuer's conduct conformed to the
literal language of the bond indenture, see Sharon Steel Corp. v. Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A., 691
1990] 1503
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court should read into the contract an implied term restricting debt issu-
ances, possibly based on extrinsic evidence as to the parties' intent. The first
and third approaches arguably merge, because the terms that a court will
infer are basically those that it believes rational parties would want.
The problem of contractual omissions and/or implied terms is at the heart
of the modem law and economics approach to contract law.27 Proponents of
this approach agree that the court should allocate unanticipated risks by at-
tempting to recreate the bargain that rational parties would have reached
had they focused on the omission. But what rules would rational parties
agree upon under conditions of hypothetical bargaining? According to the
Easterbrook and Fischel view, courts should adopt whatever default rule
maximizes aggregate value, regardless of its distribution among the parties.28
Conversely, Professors Ayres and Gertner have argued that courts should
apply a "penalty" default rule under which any party possessing private in-
formation would be forced to reveal it to the other or have the court adopt a
presumption unfavorable to it.29 The premise of this latter approach is that
it is "information revealing" and thus ensures that the contracting process
results in a more complete agreement in which the parties bargain on the
basis of equal knowledge. Although a penalty default rule will not maximize
value ex post, its ex ante effect is to create an incentive for the parties to
reveal their future intentions and to contract for explicit permission, because
otherwise the court will construe ambiguous terms or the duty of good faith
F.2d 1039, 1051-52 (2d Cir. 1982); Van Gemert v. Boeing Co., 553 F.2d 812, 815 (2d Cir. 1977),
aff'd, 444 U.S. 472 (1980); cf Pittsburgh Terminal Corp. v. Baltimore & O.R. Co., 680 F.2d 933,
942-43 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1056 (1982). For an excellent review of the law in this area,
see Bratton, The Economics and Jurisprudence of Convertible Bonds, 1984 Wis. L. REV. 667.
27. For a description of the "hypothetical bargaining" approach under which a court faced with
an omission asks itself what term rational actors would have agreed upon, see R. POSNER, Eco-
NOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 79-85 (3d ed. 1986). See also Jordan v. Duff & Phelps, Inc., 815 F.2d
429, 435-39 (7th Cir. 1987) (although not within the employment contract, employer owed fiduciary
duty to disclose impending merger to shareholder/employee planning to resign who upon resigna-
tion was required to sell shares back to the employer at book value). Other theorists have suggested
that courts should'sometimes use a "penalty" default rule that deliberately does not represent the
bargain the parties would have struck but instead induces the contracting party possessing private
information to reveal private information it possesses by construing ambiguous terms against it.
The premise to this approach is that it is "information revealing" because it induces the party
possessing asymmetric information, with the result that the other contracting party can then better
price the rights and risks of the transaction. See Ayres & Gertner, Filling Gaps in Incomplete
Contracts: An Economic Theory of Default Rules, 99 YALEL.J. 87, 97-101 (1989).
Besides the Posnerian approach, which looks for the result that would maximize aggregate
wealth regardless of its distribution, and the "penalty" approach of Ayres and Gertner, supra, still
other approaches exist. Professor Bratton, for instance, has argued that the "burden of specificity
[should be] on the party who seeks to disrupt settled expectations." Bratton, Corporate Debt Rela-
tionships: Legal Theory in a Time of Restructuring, 1989 DuKE L.J. 92, 148-49. Under this ap-
proach, the burden might be on the corporate issuer to justify a sharp increase in leverage.
28. See Easterbrook & Fischel, Corporate Control Transactions, 91 YALE L.J. 698, 700-04 (1982).
29. See Ayres & Gertner, supra note 27, at 95-107.
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to prevent the party possessing private information from using it
opportunistically.
Obviously, these two approaches to gap-filling in incomplete contracts can
lead to very different outcomes in bondholder suits of the type under discus-
sion. If one believes the parties' dominant concern would be value max-
imization, then because virtually every commentator has found that
stockholders' gains have exceeded bondholders' losses, bondholders would
lose their suit. If, however, one prefers a "penalty" default rule because of
the likelihood of asymmetrical information, then bondholders may have a
much stronger case-at least when management anticipated, but did not re-
veal, the prospect of a restructuring or other measure that increased firm-
specific risk. It is not self-evident which rule is superior, and even propo-
nents of the former approach sometimes reveal a sympathy for elements of
the latter. Thus, even a judge as conservatively focused on wealth maximiza-
tion as Judge Easterbrook has assumed that all contracts contain an implied
term that neither side will behave "opportunistically.
'30
Still, a preliminary question must be answered before either approach be-
comes applicable: is there a gap in the contract at all? On a theoretical level,
one can make a persuasive case that gaps are inevitable because long-term
relational contracts are necessarily incomplete. 31 "Bounded rationality" is a
fact of life, which economics cannot ignore, and it implies that parties do not
anticipate all future contingencies. This is particularly so in long-term con-
tracting, because there are inevitable cognitive limitations on the human
mind's information processing capacity.
32
Yet, even if some gaps are inevitable, it does not follow that the parties
would leave the most important terms and contingencies in the contract
open. In this light, one can ask whether a rational creditor would have ig-
nored a contingency as important as a limitation on debt incurrences. Ar-
guably, such an omission amounts to a consent. Yet, the problem of gap
definition is more complicated, as a brief historical survey may help reveal.
B. THE DISAPPEARANCE OF FINANCIAL COVENANTS
Prior to 1985, the financial marketplace had not seen firms suddenly
restructure themselves in the aggressively leveraged manner that Unocal and
Phillips Petroleum both did in that year. These transactions each resulted in
30. See Jordan v. Duff& Phelps, Inc., 815 F.2d 429, 438 (7th Cir. 1987) (Easterbrook, J.) ("One
term implied in every written contract and therefore, we suppose, every unwritten one, is that
neither party will try to take opportunistic advantage of the other.").
31. For a good statement of this position, see Goetz & Scott, Principles of Relational Contracts,
67 VA. L. REV. 1089, 1092 (1981).
32. This concept, which originated with Herbert Simon, has been most fully articulated by Oliver
Williamson. See Williamson, Transaction-Cost Economics: The Governance of Contractual Rela-
tions, 22 J.L. & ECON. 233 (1979).
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the companies' debt ratings falling from AA to BB-a level below investment
grade. 33 Nor are these cases simply isolated events. By 1986, the pattern
had become prevalent; debt downgradings by Standard & Poor's in that year
exceeded upgradings by a two-to-one margin.
34
Yet, even if bondholders did not have actual precedents to rely on prior to
1985, one can argue that the risk that management would restructure so as to
"leverage the firm up to the eyeballs" was obvious. One answer may be that
while creditors recognized this possibility, they also perceived no managerial
incentive to engage in such conduct. During the halcyon days of the 1970s,
creditors learned, based on their experience with the conglomerate acquisi-
tion waves of the 1950s and 1960s, that they need no longer fear managerial
discretion in the large publicly held corporation. Even when conglomerate
acquisitions increased leverage significantly, debt investors may have found
that this impact was typically offset by a co-insurance effect, at least if the
combining firms' cash flows were partially covariant. In addition, creditors
observed over time that management had its own incentives to pursue
growth and expansion, and to avoid excess leverage. Thus, to the extent that
stability and the avoidance of risk appeared to be the common goals of man-
agement and bondholders during this era, most bond covenants restricting
extreme leverage seemed superfluous (or at least not worth the interest rate
penalty that the issuer might demand). Moreover, management often had
legitimate reasons to seek the elimination of negative covenants that re-
stricted additional debt or limited such issuance to a percentage of net worth.
For example, management would often issue such debt to acquire assets that
could not be valued on the firm's balance sheet at a value equal to the securi-
ties issued in exchange for it. 35 In practice, such issuances might reduce
firm-specific risk and thereby benefit both managers and bondholders. As a
result, bondholders and managers had common interests with which negative
covenants could sometimes interfere.
36
From a historical perspective, the 1985 Unocal and Phillips Petroleum
restructurings, which were undertaken as novel takeover defenses, occurred
in a watershed year. 1985 was also the year in which management perfected
33. For the view that these two transactions represented a watershed, see Bratton, supra note 27,
at 137.
34. Ma at 138 (footnote omitted).
35. This would be the case, for example, when goodwill had to be created as a balance sheet entry
or when the acquired firm was otherwise purchased on the basis of its expected future earnings,
rather than on the market value of its physical assets.
36. Negative covenants could also give rise to holdout problems if some, but not all, bondholders
were willing to waive them. Legal restrictions exist on the ability of bondholders to grant a waiver
in the case of publicly held debt. See Roe, The Voting Prohibition in Bond Workouts, 97 YALE L.J.
232, 250-51 (1987) (Trust Indenture Act prohibits majority modification of indenture core terms
including price and maturity).
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the poison pill and the Delaware courts upheld it.37 In this light, the expla-
nation given by the bondholder plaintiffs in the RJR Nabisco 38 litigation has
some plausibility: they did not seek negative covenants on additional debt
issuances because they assumed that debt would be issued only for "business
purposes. ' 39 At the time, the risk that debt would be issued essentially to
fund distributions to shareholders seemed nonexistent in the case of a "world
class," publicly held corporate issuer.
The explanation that bondholders failed to understand the changing na-
ture of the credit markets in which they participated has, however, an impor-
tant flaw: internal documents discovered by the defendant in the RJR
Nabisco litigation seem to show that the plaintiff creditor, Metropolitan Life,
was well aware of the "event risk" posed by LDOs at the time it lent to RJR
Nabisco.40 Metropolitan Life did nothing, apparently because it was con-
cerned that its competitive position vis-a-vis other lenders would be injured if
it began to demand new covenants.
41
Does this mean that Metropolitan Life accepted the risk? Met Life's an-
swer is that the risk it accepted was that RJR Nabisco would issue additional
debt, not that it would "deliberately liquidate its shareholders' equity after
selling the bonds expressly on that assumption." 42 That is, had debt been
issued for a productive business purpose, Met Life acknowledged that it
could have raised no objection, but the issuance of debt to eliminate the
"huge base of shareholders' equity [that] was a principal underpinning of the
'investment grade' ratings from Standard & Poor's and Moody's that were
solicited by RJR to sell the bonds" constituted, in its judgment, a violation of
an implied covenant. 43 In this view, the implied covenant was not a debt
limitation, but rather a distribution restriction, and the amendments of the
indenture to remove negative covenants did not affect it.
This argument may, however, involve too fine a distinction. Clearly,
37. See Moran v. Household Int'l, Inc., 500 A.2d 1346, 1356-57 (Del. 1985) (upholding "flip-
over" poison pill defense whereby target shareholders receive rights to purchase the bidder's stock
at a discount if the bidder merges with the target or consolidates with it through some equivalent
transaction); see also Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 958 (Del. 1985) (uphold-
ing discriminatory corporate repurchase of shares as a takeover defense tactic).
38. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. RJR Nabisco, Inc., 716 F. Supp. 1504 (S.D.N.Y. 1989).
39. Id. at 1516.
40. Defendants pointed out that the indenture had twice been amended, in 1983 and 1985, to
eliminate negative covenants that would have prohibited the RJR Nabisco leveraged buyout and
that internal documents of the chief creditor showed that it was fully conscious of this risk. Id. at
1510-11.
41. Id. at 1513.
42. See Letter from Philip K. Howard, Counsel for Metropolitan Life in the RJR Nabisco case,
to Professor E. Allan Farnsworth, Columbia University School of Law 1 (Jan. 10, 1990) (comment-
ing on an earlier draft of this article and stating the theory of plaintiff's case) (copy on file at The
Georgetown Law Journal).
43. Id. at 1.
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Judge Walker at the District Court level thought so in dismissing Met Life's
suit, but an appeal is pending before the Second Circuit. Whatever the out-
come of the case, this distinction seemingly goes to the heart of the question
of what kinds of behavior are "opportunistic": borrowing money need not be
opportunistic, but distributing the equity easily can be. Yet, is the distinction
manageable? What if only half the borrowed funds were paid out as a divi-
dend? Is any material increase in dividends above the corporation's historic
rate "opportunistic" if it is based on borrowed funds? Not only is it difficult
to define opportunism in this context, but a judicial power to distinguish
"good" borrowings from "bad" borrowings, or "good" mergers from "'bad"
mergers, creates great uncertainty in the capital markets. 44 At this point, the
court would simply be adding a new substantive term to the agreement,
rather than simply forbidding one party from undercutting rights that the
other party bargained for. In terms of precedent, courts have not filled this
large a gap with an implied term. In the District Court's view, the omission
at issue in RJR Nabisco-the failure to limit subsequent debt issues-in-
volved too central and prominent a term in the contract to expect a court to
discover, on these facts alone, an omission that it could fill or an implied
condition that protected the bondholders.45 Arguably, the absence of a re-
striction on additional debt is less a gap than a triumphal arch through which
bondholders invited the issuer to proceed, even if in theory an analytic dis-
tinction can be drawn between debt issuances for "business purposes" and
those to fund distributions to shareholders.
Doctrinally, the problem with Met Life's attempt to rely on the duty of
good faith to prevent all forms of opportunism is that the role of this duty
has traditionally been more to constrain the exercise of a discretionary power
possessed by one party in an ongoing contractual relationship than to trump
44. In Hartford Fire Ins. v. Federated Dep't Stores, 723 F. Supp. 976 (S.D.N.Y. 1989), plaintiffs
argued that although the bond indenture neither restricted additional indebtedness nor barred a
merger, it intended only to authorize "traditional" mergers and borrowings in the ordinary course
of business. The court rejected this claim squarely:
[N]othing in the Indenture supports this distinction between 'good' and 'bad' mergers or
'ordinary' and 'extraordinary' debt. Moreover, permitting courts to weigh the virtues of
such transactions on a case-by-case basis threatens to inject an impermissible degree of
uncertainty into the bond market.
Id. at 992.
45. 716 F. Supp. at 1519. As the RJR Nabisco court said, "the implied covenant will only aid
and further the explicit terms of the agreement and will never impose an obligation 'which would be
inconsistent with other terms of the contractual relationship.'" Id. at 1517 (quoting Sabetay v.
Sterling Drug, Inc., 69 N.Y.2d 329, 335, 506 N.E.2d 919, 922, 514 N.Y.S.2d 209, 212 (citation
omitted)). Although additional facts, such as the issuer's efforts to obtain an investment grade debt
rating, may justify judicial relief by suggesting an implied representation, the district court in the
RJR Nabisco case assumed that the issuer had intentionally sought an investment grade debt rating
and still granted summary judgment for the corporate issuer. See id. at 1514, 1526.
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express terms in the contract or to substitute implied terms for terms that
were removed from the contract by express amendment. 46 Courts may disre-
gard an express term only when they find that the term is "unconscionable."
Yet, it is usually the creditor, not the debtor, whose behavior is alleged to be
unconscionable. Given the relative equality of the parties' bargaining
power,4 7 it seems unlikely that the debtor's failure to bind its own hands and
preclude additional debt issuances could ever be described as "unconsciona-
ble." If so, absent fraud or a breach of representation by the issuer, the bond-
holders would appear to lose.48
C. THE DECLINE OF IMPLICIT CONTRACTING
This conclusion that the law provides few remedies for those who do not
contract for protection leads us back to our earlier puzzle: what explains the
mysterious failure of bondholders who purchased investment grade debt to
negotiate for contractual provisions? If Met Life should not have believed
that the law protected it, what other explanations are possible? Of course,
there is always the possibility that Met Life simply blundered, that it made a
unique mistake which other institutional investors avoided. This seems un-
likely, because other institutions have either made similar mistakes or have
also recently sued or vehemently protested.49 Two other explanations seem
more promising. First, one possibility is that inadequate information caused
a market failure. Evidence of this theory may lie in the failure of the bond
rating agencies to downgrade the debt securities of issuers such as RJR
46. See, eg., Broad v. Rockwell Int'l Corp., 642 F.2d 929, 957-58 (5th Cir. 1981) (en banc)
(directors did not breach fiduciary duty to debenture holders in approving merger that negatively
affected debenture values because debenture holders assumed risk); Gardner & Florence Call
Cowles Found. v. Empire, Inc., 589 F. Supp. 669, 673-74 (S.D.N.Y. 1984) (state contract law re-
quirement of good faith not breached when merger did not deprive debenture holders of rights
explicitly granted in contract); see also Tauke, Should Bonds Have More Fun? A Reexamination of
the Debate Over Corporate Bondholder Rights, 1989 COLUM. Bus. L. REv. 1, 123-33 (improper for
courts to apply implied duty of good faith to create substantive protection for bondholders when
inconsistent with express terms of bond contract).
47. See RJR Nabisco, 716 F. Supp. at 1521 (citing Rakoff, Contracts of Adhesion: An Essay in
Reconstruction, 96 HARV. L. REv. 1173 (1982)).
48. One other theory remains for plaintiffs: breach of representation. In fact, Metropolitan Life
raised a potentially meritorious breach of representation argument, claiming that RJR Nabisco's
active solicitation of an investment grade bond rating amounted to a representation that it would
not take voluntary action to undercut that rating. The court noted this argument in RJR Nabisco,
716 F. Supp. at 1514 & n.18, but never satisfactorily addressed it in the decision. Yet, even if this is
deemed an implied representation, there remains the puzzling question of how long the representa-
tion survives. Does the issuer's solicitation of an investment grade rating really bind it to maintain
that rating for the life of the bonds? Such a claim seems heroically overstated.
49. According to one recent study prepared by security analysts at Salomon Brothers, of a total
of $147 billion of bonds vulnerable to "event risk," $54 billion of them were affected, "causing
direct losses to investors of nearly $3 billion between 1986 and 1989." See Henriques, End of the
"Event Risk" Nightmare?, N.Y. Times, Mar. 11, 1990, Bus. at 15, col. 4.
1990] 1509
THE GEORGETOWN LAW JOURNAL
Nabisco. Met Life did not stand alone in its failure to respond to the risk if
these rating agencies continued RJR Nabisco's rating at investment grade,
even in the absence of negative covenants. A final possibility is that institu-
tional investors relied on an implicit contract to protect them-that is, they
believed that their long-term relationship with the corporate issuer would
deter the latter from seeking to exploit short-term advantages. Under this
story, implicit contracting broke down under the pressure of hostile
takeovers.
The first theory of market failure must explain why information that so-
phisticated investors would have wanted did not reach them. At least with
respect to traders in the secondary market, it is arguable that information
about negative covenants is not available within the limited time available for
making trading decisions. 50 Until recently, the screen trader buying debt se-
curities in the secondary market often had little understanding about, or ac-
cess to, information concerning the negative covenants applicable to the
security. Even when the terms of the covenants were available, the trader
may have still been uncertain about their efficacy. Although these traders'
Quotran screens could tell them the security's interest rate and the issuer's
credit rating, information about ambiguities in the indenture's covenants
does not reduce well to the kind of symbols that can appear on a computer
screen. Ultimately, this simply may be another example of information tech-
nology's tendency to squeeze out the softer variables in favor of those more
easily quantified.
One difficulty with this argument, however, is that in principle, financial
intermediaries-here, the credit rating agencies-should have been able to
overcome the information cost problem inherent in gathering data about neg-
ative covenants. Still, until recently, the evidence indicates that they made
little attempt to deal with the special problem of event risk.51 As a result,
50. This argument does not apply, however, to institutions such as Met Life that negotiated these
covenants or at least bought the securities from the issuer in the primary market.
51. One recent study finds that Standard & Poor's changed its bond rating on average only 4.9
months after an LBO announcement; and Moody's, after only 4.7 months. This slow pace hardly
suggests a diligent effort to present relevant information to consumers. See A. Warga & I. Welch,
supra note 24, at 9. Even more pervasive problems exist with the market for information. Bond
rating agencies are paid a modest amount by the issuer to review the issuer's securities, and typi-
cally the review process is cursory. Only the ratings of two agencies-Moody's and Standard &
Poor's-truly count, and such an oligopolistic market structure falls far short of perfect competi-
tion. In particular, bond rating agencies are thought to be slow in responding to new information
and in changing ratings. Often, a rating change is an event that follows, rather than precedes, the
market's adverse reaction to a change in the company's financial position. See Hettenhouse &
Sartoris, An Analysis of the Information Value of Bond-Rating Changes, 16 Q. REV. ECON. & Bus.
65, 76 (1976) (rating changes have little value because market price sufficiently reflects changed
circumstances); Tauke, supra note 46, at 37-40 (failure of many bonds to decrease in market price
after downgrading by rating agency probably reflects that bond market is only efficient for well-
known, heavily traded debt instruments). Such delayed rating changes are of more interest to his-
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"contract term" information may not have been priced as efficiently as infor-
mation about interest rates or firm creditworthiness. In addition, the value
of a negative covenant cannot always be reliably evaluated until it is tested
under circumstances in which the issuer would like to escape its restric-
tions.52 Therefore, traders may initially place insufficient value on "strong"
negative covenants or an excessive premium on "weak" ones. If the market
cannot distinguish "strong" indentures from "weak" ones at relatively low
cost, then it may treat all issuers alike, and as a result, management will get
little in return for binding its own hands effectively. Under these circum-
stances, a classic "market for lemons" could develop.
5 3
Market failures are easier to predict than prove. What evidence then sup-
ports this claim that the market for information about bonds malfunctioned?
First, one could cite the extraordinary increase in the information now pro-
vided by bond rating agencies about event risk. An entirely new rating sys-
tem was put into effect in 1989 specifically to address this problem.54 Yet, an
increase in the information provided does not alone prove a market failure;
torians than security analysts and explain the popular phrase in the industry that bond ratings are
"rear-view mirrors." Finally, the reviewers who rate bonds at these agencies are usually modestly
paid clerks, who seldom have the skills of highly trained and compensated corporate attorneys. For
critiques of the performance of bond rating agencies, see J. PETERSEN, THE RATING GAME: A
REPORT TO THE TWENTIETH CENTURY FUND TASK FORCE ON MUNICIPAL BOND RATINGS
(1974); Coffee, Market Failure and the Economic Case for A Mandatory Disclosure System, 70 VA.
L. REV. 717, 745-46 (1984). Still, the bond rating process is changing, albeit slowly, in response to
the demand for new types of information. See infra note 54.
52. The first "poison put" debt covenants proved to be ineffective because they applied only to
"hostile" transactions and could be evaded if the transaction at the last minute went "friendly."
Other loopholes have been detected in more recent poison puts. See Steinwutzel & Gardner, Super
Poison Puts As a Protection Against Event Risk; INSIGHTS Oct. 1989, at 3-6 (surveying various trig-
gering events for "poison puts" and concluding that they are not panaceas for bondholder
protection).
53. Such a development is possible when a firm cannot credibly signal that its covenants are
effective restraints. Under such conditions, attempts to outperform the market average are futile
and wasteful. For the standard account of this phenomenon, see Akerlof, The Market For "Lem-
ons" Quality Uncertainty And The Market Mechanism, 84 Q.J. ECON. 488 (1970). To the extent
that issuers cannot convince the market that their covenants are more effective than the "weak"
covenants of other issuers, it becomes inefficient to include truly restrictive covenants in the trust
indenture. Further, if as a result of the securitization of debt offerings, the issuer need not negotiate
its debt covenants with sophisticated purchasers and also cannot easily distinguish its covenants
from those of other issuers, these linked developments may imply that less incentive will exist to
write meaningful, individually tailored debt restrictions-at least as long as the issuer receives little
in return for doing so. Of course, this state of affairs may be a temporary, even fleeting phenome-
non, and it seems unlikely to arise in private placement transactions in which issuer and institu-
tional investor can bargain at length.
54. Standard & Poor's Corp. announced in July 1989 that it would start a new rating service to
evaluate takeover protection that issues offered debt investors. The resulting five-tier rating system
(called "Event Risk Covenant Rankings") has been applied to 14 issues containing poison puts.
Interestingly, only one security of the 14 so rated was given the highest rating of E-l; this suggests
that poison put provisions may sometimes be ambiguous or illusory. See Gilpin, S & P to Rate
Protection on Takeovers, N.Y. Times, July 22, 1989, at 31, col. 6.
THE GEORGETOWN LAW JOURNAL
rather, it could simply indicate an increase in the demand for information as
investors became aware of new risks and, in turn, became willing to invest
greater amounts in securities research. Still, two other items of evidence sup-
ply important corroborating evidence of market failure. First, a study by
Professors Asquith and Wizman has found an extraordinary amount of error
and inconsistency in the information published by bond rating agencies. 55
Comparing the information in Moody's Industrial Manual with the actual
prospectuses for the bonds, they found the Moody's description to be incor-
rect in 36 out of 171 cases studied (or 21%).56 Another study by Professors
Warga and Welch shows that bond rating agencies respond even to publicly
disclosed events at a dilatory pace.57 On average, they found that Moody's
delayed 4.7 months after the LBO announcement before lowering its rating;
and Standard and Poor's, 4.9 months. 58 These findings are consistent with
earlier studies that have found the market generally not to react to ratings
changes, apparently because the market had already anticipated the ratings
decline.59 In this light, rating agencies seem to have functioned more as
"rear view mirrors," reporting assessments already reached by the market,
than as purveyors of new information. To be sure, the limited role played by
bond rating agencies does not alone prove that the bond market was ineffi-
cient, but it does negate the possibility that informational intermediaries were
the mechanism that made the market efficient. Absent some institution to
reduce and spread the costs of obtaining highly technical information, frag-
mented investors will not incur these costs on an individual basis and the
level of information in the market will be suboptimal.
Fairness, however, also requires the recognition that these inefficiencies in
the secondary trading market cannot account for the failure of institutional
investors to insist upon strong negative covenants in the primary market
(where transactions are negotiated on a face-to-face basis). Nor was any of
these informational problems insurmountable, as the bond market's shocked
reaction to the RJR Nabisco LBO transaction showed. In the aftermath of
RJR Nabisco, suddenly virtually all bond offerings came to contain a new
contractual protection-the "poison put."6  A fuller explanation therefore
requires that we examine the position of the investor's principal agent: the
55. See P. Asquith & T. Wizman, Event Risk, Wealth Redistribution and the Return to Existing
Bondholders in Corporate Buyouts 11 (Feb. 1990) (unpublished manuscript) (copy on file at The
Georgetown Law Journal).
56. Id.
57. A. Warga & I. Welch, supra note 24, at 9.
58. Id.
59. See, eg., Grier & Katz, The Differential Effects of Bond Rating Changes Among Industrial
and Public Utility Bonds by Maturity, 49 J. Bus. 226 (1976); Hettenhouse & Sartoris, supra note 51,
at 65.
60. See infra notes 83-89 and accompanying text.
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bond underwriter. Why did it not do a better job of negotiating adequate
covenants or other protections for its customers? Why did bond underwrit-
ers ignore the problem of event risk for so long?
The best way to approach an explanation of the bond underwriter's argua-
bly compromised position is to begin with the curious disappearance of nega-
tive covenants from bond indentures during the 1970s and early 1980s.
61
While financial economists have given little attention to this transition, the
contrast over a decade is striking. A well-known study by Smith and
Warner, which examined eighty-seven public issues between 1974 and 1975,
found that over ninety percent contained a negative covenant restricting the
issuance of additional debt.62 Yet, examining ninety-two companies in the
1980s, McDaniel found that only twenty.eight percent of issues then in-
cluded a similar covenant (and only sixteen percent of newer issues did).63
Reflecting this shift, the American Bar Association adopted a new stream-
lined model indenture in the early 1980s that largely dispensed with business
covenants on the assumption that investors did not care about them.64 Inter-
estingly, the disappearance of negative covenants was not limited to publicly
issued debt. A 1987 study of leveraged buyouts by Marais, Schipper, and
Smith6s found that "more than 80 percent of [the] private long-term debt" in
their sample lacked "covenants restricting the issuance of additional debt of
equal or higher seniority."' 66 Moreover, they found that private debt repre-
sented the largest single category of nonequity security in their survey.67
Thus, even in the private placement context, in which it is far easier to tailor
special debt covenants (and in which fewer issuers have very strong credit
61. McDaniel, Bondholders and Corporate Governance, 41 Bus. LAW. 413, 425-26 (1986) (re-
porting survey of Fortune 100 corporations and finding that few had negative covenants in their
indentures). Of course, negative covenants remain common in bank loan agreements, but these are
easily renegotiated and banks can be more easily compensated on an ex post basis for accepting
additional risk. Still common in bond indentures is the negative pledge clause and certain prohibi-
tions on sale and leaseback transactions, but all other "business covenants" appear to be vanishing.
Id. at 426.
62. Smith & Warner, On Financial Contracting: An Analysis of Bond Covenants, 7 J. FIN. ECON.
117, 123 (1979).
63. McDaniel, supra note 61, at 425-26. For a more recent discussion of this transition, see
Bratton, supra note 27, at 139-42.
64. A.B.A. Section of Corp., Banking & Bus. Law, Model Simplified Indenture, 38 Bus. LAW.
741, 743 (1983).
65. Marais, Schipper & Smith, Wealth Effects Of Going Private For Senior Securities, 23 J. FIN.
ECON. 155 (1989).
66. Id. at 161, 164. This finding that privately placed debt also lacked such business covenants
contradicts the traditional view, as set forth in Smith & Warner, supra note 62, at 150-51, that
purchasers of privately placed debt, being riskier, demanded such covenants while purchasers of
much less risky publicly held debt. were willing to dispense with them as superfluous. Apparently,
the disappearance of these covenants was. an across-the-board phenomenon that did not relate
closely to the risk level of the debt.
67. Marais, Schipper & Smith, supra note 65, at 161.
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ratings), debt covenants restricting subsequent debt issuances seem to have
largely disappeared.
What explains this pattern? One can describe bondholders in the early
1980s as either exhibiting an unjustified complacency or as relying on an
implicit contract, but either description is very different from asserting that
they had knowingly accepted the risk that LBOs would come to pose. Put
simply, bondholders had learned to trust management, but management had
not acknowledged any reciprocating legal duties to bondholders. Because
bondholders relied on custom, rather than on contracting, management may
be said to have breached their trust, but not the contract.
Still, even if bondholders were complacent or overly trusting, why did not
their agents-the underwriters-protect them? Typically, underwriters ne-
gotiate with the issuer the terms of the bond indenture as the advance agent
of the bond purchasers. In this capacity, underwriters seem to have aban-
doned a long standard covenant that restricted subsequent debt issues. The
reason for their puzzling passivity may lie in another transition that occurred
in the early 1980s: the balance of power between the corporate issuer and its
underwriters shifted sharply in the direction of the former. With the intro-
duction of expedited short-form registration on Form S-3 and later shelf re-
gistration under rule 415,68 the SEC introduced a new degree of competition
into debt underwriting. This competition chiefly benefitted the issuer, which
was now free to pick and choose among underwriters competing for its busi-
ness. In such an environment, it would not be surprising that underwriters,
anxious to hold and obtain new business, began to represent their customers'
interests less zealously. This story that underwriters were compromised as
the investors' agents by the institutional fact that the corporate issuer hires
them does not deny that there may be some reputational loss from failing to
represent the customer faithfully, but it responds that this potential loss was
outweighed by the revenues otherwise clearly at risk.
While this capsule history is undoubtedly incomplete, it sets the stage for
the major changes in the early 1980s. With little warning, takeovers went
68. Form S-3 was adopted in 1981 as part of an effort to streamline the registration process and
permit corporations already subject to the continuous reporting system of the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934 to utilize filings made under that Act for purposes of satisfying their disclosure obliga-
tions under the Securities Act of 1933. See Exchange Act Release Nos. 6331-6338 (Aug. 6, 1981),
reprinted in R. JENNINGS & H. MARSH, SECURITIES REGULATION 115-19 (6th ed. 1987). Essen-
tially, Form S-3 permits qualified issuers to incorporate by reference material filed (or subsequently
filed) under the Securities Exchange Act. R. JENNINGS & H. MARSH, supra, at 117. Rule 415,
adopted in 1983, permits the registration of securities for a delayed or continuous offering. See
Exchange Act Release No. 6499 (Jan. 17, 1983), reprinted in R. JENNINGS & H. MARSH, supra, at
199-209. Its adoption greatly telescoped the period between when an issuer decided to make an
offering of securities and when that offering could be actually brought to market. Thus, it effec-
tively fostered a competitive auction for the issuer's business, and this increased the issuer's negoti-
ating leverage with underwriters.
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from a force that produced expansion in firm size to one that, at least fre-
quently, produced contraction. With the appearance of "junk bond" financ-
ing, takeovers became a disciplinary force that contributed to the downsizing
of the conglomerate form of business organization. Diversification became a
vice, not a virtue, and a host of corporations in the early 1980s undertook
voluntary divestiture programs under the threat of a hostile takeover.69
Spin-offs, restructurings, and assets sales also became commonplace. Finally,
as private markets developed in which corporate acquisitions could be
quickly financed, the LBO matured into a force by which virtually any cor-
porate management could take virtually any company private. The symboli-
cally culminating event in this transition was, of course, the 1988 RIR
Nabisco leveraged buyout. In short, having convinced bondholders to delete
most negative covenants for reasons that seem plausibly in their mutual self-
interest, managements have exploited that trust when faced with shareholder
pressures that might otherwise result in their ouster. In the terminology that
this article will later use, this is not a story of coalition formation, but of
coalition defection.
It now seems self-evident that bondholders were surprised both by the ex-
tent of their own exposure and by the unwillingness of courts to recognize
any remedy applicable to them. But what does their surprise teach us? Per-
haps it ,suggests that institutional learning occurs slowly and that even so-
phisticated investors can lull themselves into a false sense of security. These
investors did not heed factors whose significance should have been recog-
nized earlier until a vivid case dramatized their vulnerability. Thereafter, the
markets were shocked temporarily, but in time new contractual devices and
information systems emerged. Clearly, the message of the RJR Nabisco de-
bacle for bondholders was that during an unsettled time, investors must con-
tract with the issuer and not rely on past managerial practices or reputational
capital. In time, as new contractual devices were developed, managements
found ways to put these devices to their own use-to protect themselves from
shareholders. This process by which contracting and coalition formation be-
gan to merge is the subject of Part III.
III. THE STAKEHOLDERS STRIKE BACK: NEW DEFENSES FOR THE
CONTRACTUALLY EXPOSED
A. CREDITORS
1. The Extent of Bondholder Losses
As late as 1988, commentators rejected out-of-hand the possibility that
stockholders' takeover gains came at the expense of bondholders:
69. See Coffee, supra note 4, at 52-60.
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In sum, the evidence provides no support for the hypothesis that the sup-
posed gains from acquisitions are actually transfers from the holders of
senior securities to the holders of common stock.
70
Early studies indeed showed that bondholders experienced only insignificant
losses from takeovers and LBOs, but the data on which these findings were
based were often quite thin. For example, a study by Lehn and Poulsen
found only minimal price changes in the ten days before and after the an-
nouncement of the leveraged buyout, but this conclusion was based on a
sample that consisted of the debt securities of only eight companies issuing
publicly traded, nonconvertible bonds, and all their buyouts were in the pe-
riod between 1980 and 1984.71 A later study of price effects by Marais,
Schipper, and Smith covered considerably more securities (fifty publicly
traded, nonconvertible bonds issued by some thirty firms), but all the cases
studied were before 1985.72 Again, they found only minimal price effects on
average, but they concluded that bondholders faced a maximum exposure of
ten percent of the book value of their investment as a result of the buyout.73
Such a loss by no means rivals the magnitude of shareholder gains, but it is
hardly insignificant to most bondholders.
The Marais, Schiipper, and Smith study is puzzling in that it found fre-
quent bond rating downgradings and enormous increases in leverage,74 but
only modest price effects. However, when they focused on a subsample of
firms experiencing buyouts in which (1) the buyout proposal resulted in
either a downgrading in the Moody's debt rating of the security or a signifi-
cant increase in leverage, and (2) the buyout was "nondefensive" and thus
more likely to take the market by relative surprise, they found significant
losses (at least when the increase in leverage was significant). 75 These results
suggest that downgradings by bond rating agencies are in fact associated with
real losses to bondholders, although the loss may typically precede the
downgrading.
70. See Jarrell, Brickley & Netter, The Market for Corporate Control: The Empirical Evidence
Since 1980, 2 J. ECON. PmRsp. 49, 57 (Winter 1988).
71. See Lehn & Poulson, supra note 10, at 51-52.
72. See Marais, Schipper & Smith, supra note 65, at 159.
73. Id. at 182.
74. In their sample of 113 buyouts, no firm had a debt/equity ratio exceeding .90 before the
buyout (and only 22 had a ratio over .50), but afterwards 43 firms had a ratio over .90. Id. at 161.
The median firm in their sample increased its debt/equity ratio by nearly .50, and over one-fifth of
their sample increased leverage by over .70. Id. The median leverage ratio in their study shifted
from .263 before the buyout to .845 afterwards. Id..
In nearly all ofthe cases in their study, if there was a class of rated debt outstanding, its rating
declined following a successful management buyout; in no case did it improve. Id. at 180-83. In
61% of these cases, the debt security had an investment grade rating before the buyout; in no case
did an investment grade rating survive a successful buyout. Id. at 177-80. In short, leverage in-




Other studies examining data from the same period have similarly found
significant wealth losses to bondholders, but only when the target firm's lev-
erage increase was greater than fifty percent.76 This point has significance
because the most recent studies, all completed in late 1989 or early 1990,
have uniformly found significant bondholder losses. Yet, in a sense, they are
studying a different phenomenon, because, beginning around 1985, takeovers
normally came to involve a very significant increase in leverage.
Studying successful leveraged buyouts in the 1985-1988 period, Warga and
Welch found a significantly negative average return on outstanding publicly
traded, nonconvertible bonds following the announcement of the LBO.
77
Moreover, they found that bondholder losses may be of the same order of
magnitude as equityholder gains (although still smaller in absolute size).
Why are their findings so divergent from earlier studies? Three reasons prob-
ably explain the discrepancy: (1) their data is post-1985, after which the size
of leverage increases soared; (2) they used a much wider event window (four
months before to four months after the announcement); and (3) they used
trader-quoted prices rather than exchange-based prices. This third factor re-
quires a special word of explanation because it casts considerable doubt on
the accuracy of prior studies. Price quotes from the New York or American
Bond Exchanges primarily reflect the odd-lot activities of individual inves-
tors; they cover only a limited number of issuers and a small portion of the
overall trading. In the past, trader quotes have generally been unavailable to
researchers, who have instead relied on "matrix prices." Matrix prices are
supplied by various institutional reporting services but are actually based on
formulas that simply estimate what bond prices should have been, based on
the price of U.S. Treasury securities or an actively traded equity security of
the same issuer. Employing actual trader quotes obtained from Shearson
Lehman Hutton, Warga and Welch demonstrated wide divergences between
trader quotes and matrix prices.
Although the Warga and Welch study found bondholder losses, it also
tends to undercut the explanation that takeovers are motivated by a desire to
exploit bondholders. Using cross-sectional data, they found that the amount
of bondholder losses was not significantly related to the amount of share-
holder gains.78 In this light, the motive for LBOs does not appear to be the
naked pursuit of wealth transfers from bondholders.
Two more recent studies confirm this picture. In the most detailed study
yet completed, Professors Asquith and Wizman examined a sample of 215
bonds associated with 65 buyouts and found a statistically significant decline
76. D. COOK & J. MARTIN, supra note 22, at 1, 13-16.
77. See A. Warga & I. Welch, supra note 24, at 20.
78. Id. ("Our regressions lead us to conclude that equity gains do not appear to be a significant
predictor of bondholder losses in LBOs.").
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of minus 2.6%.79 In addition, they found that 68% of all bonds studied had
a one month abnormal negative return around their event window; thus, one
large transaction (such as an RJR Nabisco) cannot bias their findings. What
is even more interesting about the Asquith and Wizman study is their next
step: they subdivided the bonds in their sample into subclasses depending on
the strength of their negative covenants. Having done so, they found that
bonds with "strong" covenants rose 2.3% on the announcement of a buyout,
while bonds with "weak" covenants fell 2.8% and those with no covenants
sank 5.4%.80 The gain on "strong" bonds apparently occurred because their
owners recognized that these bonds would have to be redeemed in connec-
tion with the buyout since the corporation would otherwise be in default.
Yet, as a result, gains on "strong" bonds masked steep declines on "weaker"
ones.
Real as the bondholders' losses appear to be, the Asquith and Wizman
study also presents data tending to refute the claim that bondholder exploita-
tion is a significant motive for takeovers and LBOs. In the 49 successful
buyouts in their sample, they found that bondholders experienced an aggre-
gate abnormal loss of $708 million, but at the same time stockholders re-
ceived abnormal gains of over $21 billion-in short, bondholder losses were
only 3.3% of stockholder gains.8 ' Thus, while there appear to be wealth
transfers from bondholders to stockholders in takeovers, nothing suggests
that this is the motor force behind the takeover phenomenon.
The final recent study, undertaken by two Salomon Brothers analysts, goes
the furthest in terms of placing an aggregate price tag on the impact of
"event risk" on bondholders.82 Of a total of $147 billion in principal amount
of bonds classified by them as vulnerable to "event risk," they found that $54
billion were affected, and direct losses of nearly $3 billion were experienced
by investors between 1986 and 1989. In short, what could go wrong often
did go wrong-but not so frequently as to suggest systematic exploitation.
Where then are we left? Real losses are apparently experienced, but these
losses are only a modest fraction of the gains. Moreover, on a percentage
basis, the losses are so small as to make it feasible for the law to require that
79. See P. Asquith & T. Wizman, supra note 55, at 21.
80. Id. at 15.
81. Id. at 21. This figure rose from 3.3% to 7.22% if it is assumed that total debt, public and
private, on the issuer's balance sheet "falls by an amount equal to the abnormal return of the public
debtholders." Id. This seems an unlikely assumption, however, because short-term debt should
logically be less affected by event risk than long-term debt. Still, the great unknown here is the
amount of any loss on the part of employees. When added to that of the bondholders, it could
represent a much greater percentage of the shareholders' gain and thereby give greater credence to
the wealth transfer story.
82. See Henriques, supra note 49 (discussing study by Palermo, Skaperdas, and Weintraub).
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bondholders be compensated, or even held harmless, without such a legal
rule being likely to preclude takeovers.
2. Bondholder Responses
If the best evidence is now that bondholders do lose from LBOs, then we
must recognize the period of 1985-1990 as one of profound disequilibrium for
long-term creditors. But what happens next? Eventually, one would expect
that sophisticated investors would protect themselves by developing new
safeguards. Already, the pattern of these new contractual protections has
crystallized and become known as the "poison put."
In brief, the poison put is a right given in the debt instrument to bondhold-
ers to demand repayment at their option of the full principal amount of the
indebtedness (possibly plus a premium) in the event of certain occurrences
such as a takeover, restructuring, recapitalization, or merger.83 Between
only January and June 1989, over fifty debt issues, totaling approximately
$14 billion in principal amount, have contained such event risk protections.84
Poison put bonds first appeared in early 1986 (probably in direct response
to the Revlon takeover the preceding fall).8 5 However, the event that clearly
traumatized bondholders was the RJR Nabisco buyout in 1988. Immedi-
ately, the popular financial press reported that the bond market had been
seized by hysteria. Unable otherwise to offer long-term debt, several firms,
including Harris Corp., Williams Cos.' Northwest Pipeline Unit, Becton,
83. To date, poison puts have been used more to compensate bondholders against event risk than
to deter hostile takeovers. Generally, poison puts (or "super poison puts" in the more extravagant
language of the financial press) are triggered if a "designated event" (as defined) occurs and a speci-
fied decline also takes place in the debt's rating by either Standard & Poor's Corp. or Moody's
Investois Services, Inc. Sometimes, a decline in the rating of both rating agencies is required.
"Designated events" are typically defined as (1) a change in control, usually demonstrated by the
acquisition of either 20% or 30% of the issuer's stock by a person or group; (2) a merger or acquisi-
tion of the issuer, including a sale of substantially all its assets; (3) a buy-back by the issuer of some
percentage (usually 30%) of its stock within a defined period (usually a 365-day period); (4) a
recapitalization that, either through repurchases or dividends, meets the 30% mark in a 365-day
period; or sometimes (5) a change in continuing directors-that is, a failure of a majority of the
directors to remain in office. See Heiberling, Event Risk Provisions Protect Bondholders Against
Takeovers, Nat'l L.J., June 5, 1989, at 22, col. 1. Generally, these puts have had a five or ten year
life, and thus do not last for the life of the bond. Sometimes, the issuer also has the option to
override the put provision by increasing the interest rate to a level that in the judgment of a desig-
nated investment banking firm compensates the bondholders for the increase in event risk. For a
more recent variant that gives event risk protection without being a takeover deterrent, see infra
text accompanying note 89.
84. Steinwurtzel & Gardner, supra note 52, at I; see Light, Investors Are Developing a Taste for
This Poison, Bus. WEEK, July 10, 1989, at 78.
85. See Poison Put Bonds Are Latest Weapon in Companies' Anti-Takeover Strategy, Wall St. J.,
Feb. 13, 1986, at 5, col. I (noting their use by W.R. Grace & Co. and Sperry Corp. in Jan. 1986).
Moody's Bond Survey reported 46 related industrial downgradings for 1985, 1986, and 1987, which
may also have spurred innovation in the bond market. See D. COOK & J. MARTIN, supra note 22,
at 2.
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Dickinson & Co., and Grumman Corp., adopted poison put provisions in
1988.86 A typical poison put would entitle the holders of $50 million in face
amount of debentures due in the year 2010 to be immediately paid this
amount if a tender offer were made or if any person or group acquired more
than twenty percent of the voting shares of the company. Particularly if in-
terest rates had risen after the time of the debentures' issuance, the result
could be a considerable windfall because debt securities trading in the market
for, say, $45 million suddenly become worth $50 million on their tender to
the issuer. In addition, an aggressive drafter could write the poison put to
entitle the holders to a call premium of, say, ten percent (or $5 million more
on these facts). The result then is twofold: (1) creditors are more than amply
protected against event risk;87 and (2) management has a new defensive
weapon against takeovers, one which may be less vulnerable to judicial inval-
idation than the now familiar "poison pill."88 Accordingly, the poison put
represents an initial example of a coalitional strategy of the kind that this
article suggests may become much more prevalent in future years. Here,
bondholders and management link arms to reestablish their relative control
over the firm's free cash flow, control that had been disrupted by the appear-
ance of the bust-up takeover.
The defensive utility of the poison put as an antitakeover device is only
marginal; it will not block those takeovers in which the bidder is willing to
pay off the debt. Yet, its defensive impact is hardly accidental. This is
clearer once one recognizes that the most obvious protection for bondholders
from event risk is not a put, but an upward interest rate shift in the event of a
rating downgrading. Given an active secondary market, such a provision
adequately compensates diversified bondholders and permits nondiversified
bondholders to sell into the market. Moreover, such contingent rate shifting
bonds, which also first appeared in 1989, permit the issuer to reduce the
interest rate slightly if the bond rating is upgraded.89 Given this option and
86. See Winkler & White, Shock Still Clouds Blue-Chip Corporate Bond Market, Wall St. J.,
Mar. 22, 1989, at Cl, col. 3.
87. Indeed, the early evidence suggests that bond purchasers have placed a high premium on
these new "put" provisions. For example, the Harris debenture issue, which was one of the first
debenture issues to contain this provision, traded at 120 basis points over U.S. Treasury securities,
instead of at the 160-190 basis points at which other debentures of similar risk levels were traded.
See Heiberling, supra note 83, at 25, col. 4. In short, the market valued this poison put at from 40
to 70 basis points. In addition, the market estimated the value of the 10-year term of the Harris put
(as compared to the more typical 5 year term) at 10-20 basis points. Id. However, there is also
evidence that on close inspection, many of these puts are not as protective as they initially seem. So
far, Standard & Poor's has given only one out of 14 issuers rated its highest "event protection"
rating. See supra note 54.
88. See infra notes 122-136 and accompanying text for a discussion of why poison puts present
greater difficulties for courts than poison pills.
89. In June 1989, Enrop Corp. of Houston issued the first of these bonds pegging the yield to the
credit rating. Its bonds are rated BBB-, just above the floor in investment grade. Thus, investors
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the fact that the issuer benefits under the shifting rate formula if there is a
credit upgrading, the suspicion grows that those managements choosing to
adopt the poison put format are utilizing the bondholders' anxiety for their
own self-protective ends. In short, a coalition is formed between manage-
ment and bondholders, and stockholders are the party left out.
B. EMPLOYEES
The status of employees has both important similarities with and differ-
ences from that of creditors. Employees have obvious reasons to fear that
bust-up takeovers may result in staff reductions, pension plan terminations,
and attempts by a new employer to breach prior implicit contracts and nego-
tiate "give backs." 90 Although the actual extent of employee losses from
takeovers is debatable,91 the phenomenon of coalition formation with man-
agement to resist a takeover is more evident in this context than it is between
creditors and management. Although there have been prior instances in
which unions sought to influence control changes, 92 1989 witnessed the first
serious attempts at employee takeovers of solvent public corporations. This
observation leads to a basic contrast between creditor-and employee behavior
in this area: employees have sought to rely more on governance protections
than on contractual provisions.
Why? One reason may be that unions are greatly concerned with the iden-
tity and reputation of those seeking control but recognize that they cannot
block all control changes. Another is that employees cannot "exit" the cor-
poration as costlessly as can creditors (possibly because of firm specific capi-
tal) and so must negotiate for governance protections. To date, employee
had special reason to fear a rating decline, and Enrop responded to this need. Under its indenture,
if the credit rating is moved up to A-, the interest rate moves from 9.5% to 9.4%, but if the rating
falls one notch (to below investment grade), the rate goes from 9.5% to 12%. See Light, supra note
84, at 78. Such two-sided adjustments protect both sides.
90. The evidence about the impact of takeovers on employment is in dispute. While takeovers
are often followed by layoffs and plant closings, some studies find that in the majority of such cases,
"the layoffs would probably have occurred without changes in control because of severe industry-
wide competitive pressures." Bhide, The Causes and Consequences Of Hostile Takeovers, 2 J. APP.
CORP. FIN. 36, 39 (1989). My claim here is only that from the perspective of unions and employees,
the perceived impact of the takeover is clearly adverse to their interests.
91. Although the conventional wisdom is that takeovers cause significant reductions in employ-
ment within the target firm, empirical studies have not confirmed this view. See Lichtenberg &
Siegel, The Effect Of Control Changes On The Productivity Of US. Manufacturing Plants, 2 J. APP.
CORP. FIN. 60, 66 (1989) (finding principal impact of control changes to be on nonproduction and
staff employees, with little impact on production employees).
92. For example, unions significantly influenced a contest for control of TWA in 1985 (in part by
threatening to strike) to favor Carl Icahn over Frank Lorenzo. See Salpukas, The Long Fight for
TWA: Unions Decided the Winner, N.Y. Times, Aug. 31, 1985, at 1, col. 5. Employees have also
purchased control, typically through an ESOP, but these transactions have been both fully sup-
ported and largely structured by the incumbent management team.
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takeovers-both actual and threatened-have chiefly focused on the airline
industry, in which Northwest, United Airlines, TWA, and Eastern have all
been the subject of such activity. The pattern has, however, varied. In the
recent control contest over NWA, Inc. (the parent of Northwest Airlines),
NWA's pilots' and machinists' unions initially asked for job protection cove-
nants in their collective bargaining agreements that seemed intended to bar a
hostile takeover by, or a sale of assets to, any person unacceptable to the
unions. 93 When the pilots' collective bargaining agreement expired, press ac-
counts suggested that the unresolved character of the collective bargaining
agreement had an impact similar to that of a poison pill because management
could agree to significant salary increases if a bidder bought control in a
hostile raid;94 in effect, the raid would trigger a windfall for stakeholders.
Midway through this takeover battle, however, the union representing
NWA's 20,000 machinists submitted its own recapitalization proposal to op-
pose bids submitted by Pan Am and Marvin Davis.95 One bidder, Marvin
Davis, entered into direct discussions with NWA's principal unions.
96
Alarmed at the prospect of a coalition forming between its unions and a
hostile bidder, NWA's management obtained a temporary restraining order
in federal court barring Davis and his representatives from communicating
with NWA's unions.97 In effect, management found an answer to the danger
of coalition formation in this unique case by enjoining any such negotiations.
Nonetheless, its victory proved short-lived, as another bidder (Alfred
Checchi) eventually won control with union support.
In other recent instances, a coalition between unions and outside investors
did form. In 1989, the unions at Eastern Airlines searched for a takeover
bidder to wrest control from Frank Lorenzo and eventually formed an ulti-
mately unsuccessful alliance with a Chicago commodities broker to structure
93. See Valente, NWA's Pilots and Machinists Indicate Willingness to Oppose a Hostile Bidder,
Wall St. J., May 8, 1989, at A4, col. 2.
94. Valente & Smith, Northwest Pilots Emerge as Critical Force in Determining if NWA Gets
Taken Over, Wall St. J., Apr. 6, 1989, at A10, col. 1.
95. SeeBerg, 2 More Bidders Enter NWA Contest, N.Y. Times, June 17, 1989, at 33, col. 3.
96. In NWA, Inc. v. Davis, No. 4-88-298 (D. Minn. Apr. 13, 1989), United States District Court
Judge Harry H. MacLaughlin enjoined Marvin Davis and certain associates from engaging in
"communications or other actions which interfere with or otherwise disrupt the current or prospec-
tive contractual relations between plaintiffs and the unions representing Northwest employees." Id.
at 3. The court had first found that Mr. Davis or his representatives had "held discussions with
representatives of Northwest's principal labor unions." Id. at 2.
97. See id. The basis for this seemingly unprecedented opinion appears to have been a theory of
tortious interference with contractual rights. However, the court did not enjoin "nondisruptive
communications between defendants and Northwest's unions." Id. The line seems hazy at best
between "disruptive" and "nondisruptive" communications among a bidder and the target's unions.
Still, the case shows that sometimes managers can secure legal relief against the prospect of coali-




While airlines have been the principal targets of employee takeovers, other
companies have also been the subject of employee buyout proposals. In
1989, the unions representing workers in the Chicago and Northwestern Rail
System submitted a proposal for an employee buyout of the system's parent,
CNW Corp.99 Similarly, the Amalgamated Clothing and Textile Workers
Union proposed employee buyouts in 1989 for both Cluett Peabody & Co.
and Health-tex.100 What distinguished the airline takeover attempts was the
industry-wide effort of employers to negotiate "give backs" and benefit re-
ductions. As a result of deregulation, new entrants to the airline industry
had challenged mature firms, in part by hiring nonunionized labor at sub-
stantial savings. Faced with this competitive challenge, older firms had re-
sponded by seeking to negotiate wage reductions. Interestingly, the
backdrop to the modern history of employee takeovers is not the prospect of
job loss, but rather the threat to an above-market wage structure.
By far the most publicized transaction involving unions in 1989 was the
abortive effort by UAL's pilots' union to structure a $6.75 billion leveraged
buyout of UAL.101 The UAL buyout attempt had a long history, as the
pilots' union had played a central role in a loose coalition with several large
investors that succeeded in ousting UAL's chief executive officer, Richard J.
Ferris, in 1987.102 At one point, the union, assisted by an investment bank-
ing firm acting as an adviser, had considered and almost made a hostile
tender offer. Its efforts were thwarted, however, in large part because of the
constant and bitter opposition of UAL's other principal union-the machin-
ists' union-which negotiated a labor contract with management that effec-
tively blocked the pilots' proposed buyout through an ESOP.
10 3
Nonetheless, following a hostile bid by Marvin Davis for UAL in 1989,
98. See Salpukas, Eastern Union Set Back As Bidfor Takeover Fails, N.Y. Times, June 6, 1989, at
DI, col. 1.
99. See Marsh, CNW Unions Submit Offer to Buy Stake, Wall St. J., June 5, 1989, at A4, col. 4.
100. See, e.g., Trachtenberg, Clothing Union to Make Offer for Health-tex, Wall St. J., June 13,
1989, at A6, col. I [hereinafter Trachtenberg, Clothing Union Offer]; Trachtenberg, Textile Union
Discloses Hays as Partner In Its Attempts to Acquire Cluett Peabody, Wall St. J., June 6, 1989, at A6,
col. 1.
101. See Salpukas, Out of Disorder, a Deal: 5 Weeks of UAL Talks, N.Y. Times, Sept. 19, 1989,
at Dl, col. 2. In April 1990, a revised and reduced buyout for $4.38 billion was made by all three of
UAL's principal unions and was accepted in principle by UAL's board of directors. See Salpukas,
Owner Backs Sale Of United Airlines To Worker Group, N.Y. Times, Apr. 7, 1990, at 1, col. 3.
102. For a detailed account of the origins of this buyout attempt in 1987, see Hyde & Livingston,
Employee Takeovers, 41 RUTGERS L. J. 1131, 1154-63 (1989). The pilots' union was chiefly dissat-
isfied with UAL's diversification into the hotel and car rental businesses, which UAL left after
Ferris' ouster.
103. For history of this dispute, see Airline Pilots Ass'n Int'l v. UAL Corp., 699 F. Supp. 1309
(N.D. Ill. 1988), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 874 F.2d 439 (7th Cir.), on remand, 717 F. Supp. 575
(N.D. Ill. 1989).
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UAL's management quickly switched sides and formed an alliance with the
pilots' union to propose a leveraged buyout under which employees would
acquire seventy-five percent of UAL (with the remaining equity being di-
vided between management and a third party investor, British Airways).
The corporate governance provisions negotiated to hold together this shot-
gun marriage of labor and management were specially tailored and appear to
be unprecedented. Although the unions were to have only three seats on a
fifteen-member board (With eight seats held by independent directors), two
out of the three labor directors' votes would be necessary to approve any
major decision. 104 This insistence by the pilots' union on a special veto
power over important decisions seemingly reflected a distrust of UAL's man-
agement and a fear that management would otherwise be in a position to
breach its implicit deal once the transaction was complete. For their inter-
ests to be protected, the union's representatives felt it necessary to insist on a
veto power over any major divestiture or acquisition of assets or any move
toward diversification. 0 5 In short, contractual provisions were not enough;
governance had to be shared-possibly so that free cash flow would be kept
locked in the core business.
The UAL story does not end, however, with a happy marriage of labor
and management. The machinists' union remained bitterly opposed to the
buyout throughout 1989, and their hostility, according to press reports,
caused the "unraveling [of] the deal by frightening potential lenders." 10 6
Following the inability of the original buyout proposal to obtain adequate
financing, the UAL board withdrew its support for the buyout. Nonetheless,
arbitrageurs, who had been left holding substantial blocks of UAL stock
whose value had declined precipitously after the buyout's failure, began a
consent solicitation to remove the board and approached the pilots' union for
support.107 Both the unions and shareholder groups showed that they could
form a coalition against the board as well as with it.
Finally, in early 1990 the rival unions did form an alliance and formulated
a buyout proposal based on the use of an ESOP that would give employees
seventy-five percent ownership of UAL.108 This proposal, however, excluded
UAL's chief executive officer, Stephen Wolf, from any significant equity par-
ticipation, and he apparently resisted it as a result. In effect, by early 1990
104. See Salpukas, supra note 101, at D17, col. 1. In particular, any disposition of airline assets
or any diversification into other businesses would require labor director approval. Id.
105. Id.
106. Miller & Smith, UAL's Board May Be Pushing Buy-Out Effort, wall St. J., Nov. 13, 1989, at
B2, col. 4.
107. See Salpukas, New Move for Control of UAL, N.Y. Times, Nov. 4, 1989, at 33, col. 4.
108. See Salpukas, Unions Set To Make UAL Offer, N.Y. Times, Jan. 25, 1990, at Dl, col. 3; see
also Salpukas, Labor Overcame Differences to Hammer Out a UAL Bid, N.Y. Times, Apr. 9, 1990,
at D1, col. 1 (describing negotiations among unions and with Coniston Partners).
[Vol. 78:14951524
UNSTABLE COALITIONS
the unions had come full circle back to their original position in opposition to
management. What is most striking about the UAL story is that over the
course of an almost three-year period, every coalition that could be formed
was formed: management allied with one union against another; the unions
allied with each other and with management; and ultimately the unions allied
with a powerful shareholder to outflank management. Machiavelli would
have understood this world of alternating coalition formation and defection.
In overview, recent employee buyout proposals have generally been struc-
tured to include an outside partner. Typically, a union bidder will seek an
alliance with an independent investor or another firm in the same industry
(such as British Airways in the UAL deal or KLM in the Northwest Airlines
transaction). In addition, both Eastern's unions and the Amalgamated
Clothing and Textile Workers Union secured independent investors to serve
as their partners. While this pattern can be explained as simply a search for
equity capital, it may also be intended to demonstrate the unions' credibility
as serious investors. The presence of an outside investor also distinguishes
these transactions from simpler ESOP transactions, which are also often
funded through wage concessions.10 9 Even over the last year, the scale of the
wage concessions that unions have offered has climbed rapidly. NWA's un-
ions offered somewhat vague productivity savings as their quid pro quo for
job protection. 110 Possibly more desperate, Eastern's unions appear to have
engaged in more explicit bargaining, offering "to sacrifice as much [as] 35%
of their wages to help [their preferred bidder] stem losses during a revamping
of the airline." ' Most recently, UAL's pilots offered $2 billion in wage
concessions over a five-year period in return for most of the equity in the
buyout.112
The more puzzling question is why unions believe a change in equity own-
ership matters to them. In terms of classical economic theory, businesses do
not shut down as long as average variable costs are being recovered. Even if
a new owner finds it expedient to sell divisions or liquidate the company,
viable operations do not disappear into a black hole. A new owner may ter-
minate losing operations, but in theory the former owner would do so also.
Why then are the unions so concerned? The most plausible explanation is
that unions perceive corporate control changes to pose a threat of involun-
tary wealth transfers from employees to shareholders. But how does this
happen? One empirical fact may help clarify their fears: to date, unions
109. For an example, see infra note 119.
110. See Valente & Carey, NWA Union's Restructuring Proposal Would Include Payout, Em-
ployee Stake, Wall St. J., June 2, 1989, at A4, col. 1.
11. Harlan, Eastern's Creditors, Terming Ritchie Bid Unfeasible, to Renew Talks with Carrier,
Wall St. J., June 6, 1989, at A4, col. 2.
112. See Salpukas, supra note 108, at D1, col. 1, at D4, col. 1.
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have become "players" in corporate control contests almost exclusively in
the cases of financially troubled companies or companies whose manage-
ments were seeking "give backs" and salary reductions.113 Jack Sheinkman,
the president of the clothing union seeking to buy Health-tex, has been par-
ticularly candid: "We're doing this so that we'll have some say in the future
outcome of the firm .... It's a very troubled company. If we're successful,
we plan to bring in management."
' " 4
The unions' fear appears to be either (1) that new owners can exploit the
uncertainty surrounding a financially distressed company to negotiate oppor-
tunistically for wage or other concessions that are not truly cost justified, or
(2) that new owners will not observe prior implicit contracts that the unions
had with the former owners.1 5 If workers are risk averse, they may not be
willing to call the new owner's bluff when it threatens to close or relocate
plants or operations. Indeed, some evidence suggests that the unions which
have made bids are precisely those most likely to be risk averse, because they
have already suffered significant declines in membership and would not re-
main viable if such losses continued."
6
Of course, it is not immediately apparent why the former owners could not
also exploit these same fears or why a takeover is necessary before sharehold-
ers bring coercive pressure to bear. Two different hypotheses seem possible:
(1) the former management recognized an implicit contract with the unions
that protected the latter's job security, while the new bidder team would not
respect this legally unenforceable understanding; 1"7 or (2) the shareholders,
having been frozen out by a management-union coalition that formed to lock
"free cash flow" into the firm, were eager to accept the overtures of any
bidder who would break up this coalition and divide the free cash flow with
them. In this latter view, the bidder and target shareholders represent a
counter-coalition to that of the management and the unions.
Given these fears on the part of labor, what explains the difficulty (and
indeed the marked antagonism) that unions have experienced when trying to
cooperate with each other to effect a buyout? The bitter hostility between
UAL's pilots' and machinists' unions is the most dramatic example of this
113. UAL was probably the only financially healthy target of recent employee buyout proposals,
and its management was seeking salary concessions. See id.
114. Trachtenberg, Clothing Union Offer, supra note 100, at A6, col. 2.
115. For an elaboration of this argument in traditional economic terms, see Schleifer & Sum-
mers, supra note 9, at 43-46. The old owner may be unwilling to behave opportunistically but has
no qualms about selling at a premium to those who will. Id. at 41.
116. See Trachtenberg, Clothing Union Enters the Buy-Out Fray, Wall St. J., June 1, 1989, at B8,
col. 5 (Amalgamated Clothing and Textile Workers Union declined from 325,000 to 274,000 mem-
bers over past five years).
117. This is the position taken by Schleifer and Summers: namely, that the prior management
had shown a career-long commitment to honoring the implicit contract and so was trusted by the
unions. See Schleifer & Summers, supra note 9, at 42.
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problem, and it will be analyzed further in the final section of this article. In
the' UAL buyout, the bid by management and the pilots union depended
upon wage concessions by all employees, but the two other major unions, the
machinists' and the fRight attendants', each refused to participate in the
buyout or accept pay cuts." 8 On one level, it is obvious that unions differ in
the economic position of their members and thus in their ability to finance an
ESOP with wage concessions. Not surprisingly, those unions unable to 'par-
ticipate in the ESOP (and thus not sharing in the potential for equity appreci-
ation) are more likely to be resistant to demands for wage concessions. Yet,
more seems involved than just these differences in the economic positions of
different unions, and Part V of this article will try to provide a fuller explana-
tion of the difficulties inherent in coalition formation.
Nonetheless, union activity in takeovers seems likely to grow. Once un-
ions learn that takeovers are a game that anyone can play and that they may
have the power to scare off disfavored rival bidders, they have little reason
not to use this leverage-unless they find that union-managed companies
present them with more problems and conflicts than they wish to face. The
factor most likely to increase stakeholder participation in takeovers is the
new popularity of ESOPs as a takeover defense. 1 9 Given the tax advantages
of ESOPs, they present a generally available and appealing strategy by which
a coalition can form between management and stakeholders to block a take-
over.120 But they are not unique. Poison puts and collective bargaining
agreements also permit two sides in the three-sided game of corporate gov-
ernance to conspire against the third.
In overview, one difference between the responses of bondholders and un-
ions to the threat of corporate control changes deserves special emphasis. In
the wake of event risk, bondholders have been largely satisfied with new con-
tractual protections: namely, the restoration of negative covenants and the
118. See Bartlett, United Airline Deal. A Costly Fiasco, N.Y. Times, Oct. 25, 1989, at Al, col. 2.
Eventually, the flight attendants' union agreed to participate but only after the pilots' union
dropped the requirement that the attendants accept a pay cut. Id. at D8, col. 3.
119. For a recent case in which an ESOP was used to block a takeover bid, see Shamrock Hold-
ings, Inc. v. Polaroid Corp., 559 A.2d 257, 275-76 (Del. Ch. 1989). The holding of this case appears
to be that a "shareholder neutral" ESOP (that is, one funded by employee wage concessions) is
intrinsically fair and so need not be tested by the usual Unocal takeover standard, which asks
whether the board's defensive action was "reasonable in relation to the threat." Id. (citing Unocal
Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 954-55 (Del. 1985)). Also relevant to the court's
decision was the ESOP's impact on the operation of the corporation, its "antitakeover effect," and
its effect on diluting outstanding shares of company stock. Id. at 271. The court also seemed to
place special emphasis on the secret pass-through voting and tendering structure of the Polaroid
ESOP. Id. at 273-74. In its wake, many commentators have seen the ESOP emerging as a popular
takeover defense. See Hilder & Smith, ESOP Defenses Are Likely to Increase, Wall St. J., Apr. 6,
1989, at A2, col. 2 (discussing popularity of ESOPs after successful defense by Polaroid Corp. to
1989 takeover attempt by Shamrock Holdings, Inc.).
120. See infra notes 152-153 for a discussion of ESOPs as a takeover defense.
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development of the poison put. In contrast, unions have sought governance
protections. Why? Possibly a partial answer is that long-term collective bar-
gaining agreements are not feasible or, in an inflationary world, might be
biased in favor of management. Possibly, they have firm-specific human cap-
ital invested in the firm, or possibly they are seeking to protect economic
rents in the form of above-market wages. Whatever, unions have come to
fear not just salary renegotiations, but any major change in corporate finan-
cial structure (such as a financial restructuring or a major move toward di-
versification) that might make it necessary for a successor management team
to seek financial- concessions. Thus, in the UAL bid, union directors negoti-
ated special governance provisions that gave the unions a veto power over
these matters.1 21 In effect, unions seem to have sensed the failure of con-
tracting and sought instead to form a permanent coalition by acquiring
equity.
IV. THE JUDICIAL ROLE
With increasing but still sporadic frequency, courts have invalidated as a
breach of fiduciary duty a broad range of antitakeover tactics, such as poison
pills, lock-ups, and recapitalizations. What then is distinctive about stake-
holder agreements as a takeover defense? The short answer is that these
cases involve truly bargained-for consideration, and courts find it more diffi-
cult to invalidate a deal seemingly negotiated at arm's length between tradi-
tional economic adversaries. Unlike more traditional takeover defenses,
these are bilateral agreements. For example, a poison pill is a gratuitous
transfer of warrants issued by management, in theory to protect shareholders
from coercive tender offers. In contrast, a poison put (or a similar provision
in a collective bargaining agreement) is typically not gratuitous, but is bar-
gained for between parties-the corporation and its creditors-who are nor-
mally at arms' length. With a poison put, management is in the posture of
acceding to something its creditors have demanded. No such "demand" ex-
ists in the poison pill case, and the judicial task is simplified to determining
whether management acted as a fiduciary for its shareholders.
Above all, this detrimental reliance factor distinguishes agreements be-
tween the firm and its stakeholders from traditional antitakeover defenses.
When bondholders negotiate for a poison put, they presumably give up some-
thing in the form of higher interest rates. Similarly, when a labor union ne-
gotiates for job security or makes its collective bargaining agreement
automatically terminate on the occurrence of a takeover or a defined share
acquisition, it may be forgoing higher wages. No such trade-off is present
when a board adopts a poison pill to block a potentially coercive takeover,
121. See supra text accompanying notes 101-105.
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because the shareholders do not voluntarily give up anything in return.
Hence, judicial review can be more searching (as Delaware's Unocal122 stan-
dard certainly is) because the court only has to consider the impact of the
board's action on one constituency, the shareholders. In contrast, when re-
viewing a bilateral agreement between unions or bondholders and manage-
ment, the court cannot invalidate the agreement without causing
stakeholders to suffer an uncompensated loss. Because the court cannot re-
store the status quo prior to the agreement, its willingness to grant relief will
be predictably chilled. In general, absent proof of a conspiracy to defraud,
courts do not invalidate a contract because one side gave up too much, and
courts do not claim the competence to decide how much consideration is too
much.
Stakeholders, as the new players in the takeover game, also have legitimate
interests for which to bargain. Job security, for example, has always been a
union goal in collective bargaining negotiations. On the other hand, the
prospect of collusion is clearly present when stakeholders and management
unite to lock free cash flow into the firm. How well can courts distinguish
collusion from legitimate contractual measures to protect stakeholders? The
few relevant cases to date provide mixed signals.
Perhaps the clearest illustration of a case in which management's conces-
sions to stakeholders appear to have been deliberately excessive is Gearhart
Industries, Inc. v. Smith International, Inc. 123 There, the target responded to
a creeping open market acquisition by the bidder by issuing a package of
debentures and warrants to a group of institutional investors. 124 Specifically,
the target issued nearly $100 million of subordinated debenttires and accom-
panying warrants to purchase nearly three million shares of the target's stock
several days after a bidder had accumulated over thirty-three percent of its
stock.125 Under a "springing" provision in the warrants, their exercise price
would decline from $33 per share to $24.60 per share if a tender offer was
made without the target board's approval. 126 Because the t6nder offer made
by the bidder in Gearhart was at $31 per share, the impact of these warrants,
suddenly exercisable at $24.60, was basically as dilutive to the bidder as the
typical "flip-in" poison pill, 127 with the one critical difference that the wind-
122. See Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 954-55 (Del. 1985) (takeover de-
fensive tactics must be reasonable in relation to threat to protect shareholders from "omnipresent
spectre" of board's self-interest).
123. 592 F. Supp. 203 (N.D. Tex.), aff'd in part, modified in part, 741 F.2d 707 (5th Cir. 1984).
The fact that the stock had recently traded below the warrant's strike price convinced the appellate
court that the warrants were not issued at anirrationally low price. 741 F.2d at 722-23. Query:
should irrationality be the appropriate judicial standard?
124. 741 F.2d at 722-23.
125. Id.
126. Id. at 718.
127. A "flip-in" poison pill typically involves the target granting rights to its shareholders that
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fall gain would go not to the other shareholders, but to the holders of the
subordinated debentures. Still, the court refused to enjoin this defense. In
upholding the "springing warrants," it relied on the facts that the debentures
bore interest at an effective rate that was not disproportionate to prevailing
interest rates and that the target's stock had recently traded below the exer-
cise price of the warrants. 128
Still, Gearhart's analysis seems badly flawed. The springing warrants is-
sued by the target had value only to the extent that a hostile tender offer was
made for the target. The greater their value as a deterrent, the less their
value as a free-standing warrant. By analogy, their operation was similar to a
poison put that entitles bondholders to a call premium of one hundred per-
cent in addition to the full principal amount of their debentures-but only if
a hostile tender offer is made for the target. Both securities-the hypotheti-
cal poison put bond and the springing warrants in Gearhart-respond to the
exposed position of the debt holders, but both respond excessively and in a
manner that obviously protects management. Today, the more proportional
and appropriate remedy would be the poison put that entitles the debt holder
to redeem its investment only at face value (plus possibly some modest call
premium).
If Gearhart suggests that courts will defer to the board when it offers a
collusive "bribe" to bondholders, a more recent case suggests a different ap-
proach, at least when the transaction seems to reflect the board's largesse
rather than hard bargaining. In Air Line Pilots Association International v.
UAL Corp.,129 the only case to date to deal with a "labor contract poison
pill," the UAL board inserted in the machinists' collective bargaining agree-
ment two provisions intended to deter a threatened takeover by UAL's pi-
lots' union. The first provision entitled the machinists' union, the long-
standing rival of the pilots, unilaterally to begin a new round of collective
bargaining negotiations in the event of a takeover. In effect, this provision
told the lenders to the pilots' buyout proposal that they would be "lending
into a strike." 130 The second provision established a "most favored nation"
rule for ESOPs and similar employee ownership plans, entitling all unions to
equivalent treatment with respect to such equity ownership plans, but pre-
scribing a curious rule of equality: all stock to be issued under such plans
had to be allocated not on the basis of employee salaries, but on the basis of
the wage concessions employees were willing to make from the "market
entitle them to purchase target shares at a great discount in case of a hostile bid for control or an
acquisition of a specified percentage of its shares by any person.
128. 741 F.2d at 722-23.
129. 699 F. Supp. 1309 (N.D. Ill. 1988), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 874 F.2d 439 (7th Cir.), on
remand, 717 F. Supp. 575 (N.D. Ill. 1989).
130. 874 F.2d at 441-42.
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wages" that an arbitration panel found would prevail in a free and open
(nonunion) market,1 31 Although the uncertainty created by this proposal
was itself a deterrent, it was clear, as Judge Posner found for the Seventh
Circuit, that the effect of the provision would "be to dilute the pilots' owner-
ship and control."
132
The pilots' union claimed that these provisions violated Delaware corpora-
tion law, but the district court held that the Federal Railway Labor Act pre-
empted Delaware law. 133 It then held that the same federal statute required
the invalidation of the "most favored nation" clause because the pilots had
not had an opportunity to collectively bargain over it.134 On appeal, the Sev-
enth Circuit overruled the holding that Delaware's corporation law was pre-
empted, but upheld the holding that the "most favored nation" provision
violated the federal statute.1 35 On remand, the district court held that the
antitakeover provisions in the collective bargaining agreement violated the
Unocal standard and invalidated them.
1 36
What distinguishes Gearhart from Air Line Pilots? A legal realist might
conclude that in Gearhart the special provision-the "springing warrants"-
was bargained for; but in the Air Line' Pilots case it was not. In the latter
case, the two provisions inserted into the collective bargaining agreement
were gratuitous changes offered by the board to one union in order, ironi-
cally, to block a bid proposed by another union.
Air Line Pilots is then an easy case, but in harder cases like Gearhart,
courts have not yet been willing to inquire if the excess protections stake-
holders received were necessary. Because the case law in this area is still at a
formative stage, it may be more useful to put aside the question of the appro-
priate judicial response for the remainder of this article and focus instead on
how the parties are likely to behave in this new triangular bargaining game.
V. A GAME THEORY APPROACH
To this point, this article has deliberately oversimplified by treating stake-
holders as a unified group with homogeneous preferences. Clearly this is not
so, because creditors and unions can have sharply conflicting interests. Even
within a class of employees, interests are not necessarily unified. The pro-
longed conflict between the machinists' and pilots' unions at UAL provides
dramatic evidence of the difficulties employees face in achieving unity when
confronted with a buyout. Initially, the machinists' union joined with man-
131. Id. at 442-43.
132. Id. at 443.
133. 699 F. Supp. at 1332-34.
134. Id. at 1331.
135. 874 F.2d at 439, 446-47, 448.
136. 717 F. Supp. at 588-89.
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agement to attempt to block a tender offer by the pilots' union, but later,
once management and the pilots' union had reached agreement on a buyout,
the machinists' union sought to dissuade lenders from financing the
buyout. 137 In effect, although UAL's management had originally opposed
the pilots' proposed takeover, it switched sides and joined forces with the
pilots' union once a hostile bidder announced a tender offer for UAL. Origi-
nally management's ally, the machinists eventually found themselves, at least
for a time, out in the cold. Most recently, both unions have begun discus-
sions with a shareholder group seeking to oust the incumbent manage-
ment. 13 8 A union coalition was thus eventually achieved, but only with
extraordinary difficulty and after all participants believed themselves to have
been double-crossed at least once.
This pattern of rapidly shifting coalitions seems likely to recur with fre-
quency. Confronted with a hostile bidder, management will predictably seek
to align itself with any allies who can help it fend off the outsider's attack.
Unions, in turn, may prefer the known evil to the unknown one, and thus
may prefer to form a coalition with management (at least unless they are
offered more by the hostile bidder). Logically, the unions could simply align
themselves with the highest bidder, subject to possible problems about
whether the bidder's commitments are credible. Yet if the UAL story is rep-
resentative, it appears that unions may not be able to form a united front,
even if it is in their rational self-interest to do so.
What could prevent rational self-interested economic actors from achiev-
ing their collective self-interest? Economic theory can supply an answer to
this question, but only under certain conditions whose applicability to this
context are debatable. Initially one can attempt to explain such a market
failure as a collective action problem. In a well-known work, Mancur Olson
has shown that collective action to produce a collective good often will fail
when there is no mechanism for taxing the free riders with their proportion-
ate share of the good's costs. 139 Olson argues that the larger the group, the
greater the likelihood that its members will be unable to organize to take
collective action in their mutual interest. 140
137. See generally Hyde & Livingston, supra note 102. This conflict is also well illustrated by
the Air Line Pilots litigation, described supra text accompanying notes 129-136.
138. See Salpukas, UAL Agrees to Coniston Negotiations, N.Y. Times, Mar. 23, 1990, at D4, col.
4 (noting that Coniston Partners and three of UAL's unions formed an alliance to make a new
buyout bid at an effective price between $180 to $190 per share, with the unions to acquire 75% of
the stock).
139. See M. OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION: PUBLIC GOODS AND THE THEORY
OF GROUPS 44 (1968).
140. Id. at 36. He conversely argues that "[u]nless the number of individuals in a group is quite
small, or unless there is coercion or some other special device to make individuals act in their
common interest, rational, self-interested individuals will not act to achieve their common or group
interests." Id. at 2 (emphasis omitted). Others have challenged Olson on whether group size is
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Applying Olson's logic to the takeover context, one could define the collec-
tive action problem as that of organizing the unions to share proportionately
the cost of the buyout, which typically will be taxed against them in the form
of reduced wages. Of course, the story may not be this simple. In the UAL
case, it may instead have been the case that because the machinists' and flight
attendants' unions were unable to join the buyout group, they were less will-
ing to accept the same wage concessions as the pilots' 'union, which was will-
ing to trade wage concessions for equity. Still, it is also possible that the
machinists' and flight attendants' unions simply believed that the pilots
would be willing to bear all, or a disproportionate share, of the concessions
and so, in a rationally self-interested manner, were prepared to let them do
so. In either event, if we assume all the unions would have been worse off
had a hostile raider taken control and imposed even greater concessions or
layoffs, we can postulate that the machinists' and flight attendants' unions
were seeking to some extent to "free ride" on the pilots' union. The resulting
failure of the negotiations would therefore be described as a failure of collec-
tive action. Still, viewed strictly in Olson's'terms, the collective action expla-
nation encounters a serious problem because in the context of internal
bargaining within the firm in a takeover setting, the number of actors is small
and agreement among them still seems possible. To have explanatory force,
one must show that collective action problems apply even to relatively small
groups.
A. THE PRISONER'S DILEMMA IN STAKEHOLDER NEGOTIATIONS
One way to explain the failure of small groups of rational actors to achieve
a cooperative solution is to model takeover negotiations within the firm as a
"Prisoner's Dilemma." In a Prisoner's Dilemma game, there are classically
two players, each having two choices: to cooperate or-defect. In the stan-
dard illustration of this problem, it is assumed that a prosecutor will negoti-
ate separately with each of two prisoners to secure his cooperation against
the other and that the two prisoners cannot communicate or otherwise know
what the other has done. If both prisoners independently decide to cooper-
ate, they receive a reward for cooperation in the form of a reduced sentence.
If one "defects" (i.e., turns state's evidence) while the other "cooperates"
(i.e., refuses to confess or implicate his colleague), the first prisoner will be
dealt with very leniently, and the second prisoner very harshly. If both de-
fect, however, both will receive more severe sentences (although not as severe
as that received by the prisoner who cooperated when the other defected).
really the relevant variable and have argued that in some circumstances small groups may be even
more hobbled than large ones by collective action problems. See Chamberlin, Provision of Collective
Goods As A Function of Group Size,. 68 AM. POL. Sci. REV. 707, 715 (1974).
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On these assumed facts,141 one can argue that it is always rational to defect
rather than to cooperate, because the individual's payoff is always higher





Prisoner A Cooperate A=3, B=3 A=O, B=5
Defect A=5, B=O A=1, B=1
Each player will recognize that a decision to defect presents him with two
outcomes (5 or 1), whose payoff has a weighted average of 3, whereas a deci-
sion to cooperate can only result in two outcomes of 3 and 0, whose payoff
has a weighted average of 1-1/2. Obviously each player will prefer 3 to 1-1/2
and so will defect. Yet the key point here is that what is individually rational
is not collectively rational because the collective payoff to both players from
cooperation is 3 plus 3, or 6, which is higher than any other collective payoff
available. In short, the joint payoff from cooperation (6) is higher (or Pareto
superior) to that from mutual defection (2) or any other mixed strategy, and
yet it is not achieved. The Prisoner's Dilemma is an illustration of a bargain-
ing failure caused because the players either cannot communicate with, or
cannot make credible commitments to, each other.
The appeal of the Prisoner's Dilemma approach is that it does not model
social behavior as a zero-sum game in which one side's winnings come exclu-
sively at the expense of the other side. Although such games exist (poker is
the standard example), corporate governance does not fit this model because
clearly stockholders and stakeholders share common interests (i.e., both
want the firm to remain solvent). It is generally acknowledged that Thomas
Schelling reoriented game theory by forcing its students to recognize that the
most important human confficts still involve some level of, or potential for,
tacit cooperation among the adversaries. 142 This focus on the circumstances
141. The important (and somewhat artificial) aspect of this fact pattern is that the temptation to
defect (or T, which is here the 5 or 1 payoff) exceeds the reward for cooperation (or R, which is here
3 or 0), which in turn exceeds the punishment for mutual defection (or P, which is here 1), which in
turn exceeds the "suckers's payoff" (or S, which is here 0) if one player cooperates while the other
defects. Thus, the preference rankings are T, R, P, and S. Change these rankings and the rational
strategy also changes. See R. AXELROD, THE EVOLUTION OF COOPERATION 7-10 (1984). For a
standard introduction to the Prisoner's Dilemma, see R.D. LUCE & H. RAIFFA, GAMES AND DECI-
SIONS (1957).
142. For Schelling's seminal contribution, see The Strategy of Conflict: Prospectus for a Re-
orientation of Game Theory, 2 J. CONF. REs. 203 (1958) (applying game theory to study of interna-
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under which tacit cooperation could develop among individuals pursuing
their rational self-interest led social scientists back to the problem of the Pris-
oner's Dilemma as a basic paradigm for the problems of collective action.
Still, does this paradigm fit the world of corporate governance? To under-
stand the potential relevance of the foregoing illustration to intrafirm bar-
gaining, it is useful to return to Figure One and hold the payoffs constant,
but substitute for the two prisoners some more familiar characters: a target
management and a union, both in the setting of a UAL-like takeover. As-
sume now that a hostile bid has been made and that both labor and manage-
ment will lose if the hostile bidder triumphs; that is, target management will
be out of office very quickly and the unions will face layoffs and demands for
wage concessions. If labor and management cooperate, they can structure a
leveraged buyout, possibly involving an ESOP, that will defeat the hostile
bidder (perhaps because of the tax subsidy underlying the ESOP or for other
reasons, as in the recent Polaroid case).143 Still, if either side can defect, it
will be better off. Management can defect if, after it defeats the bidder and
acquires equity control of the firm in an LBO, it can then renege on its im-
plicit commitments and lay off workers or make approximately the same
wage concession demands as the hostile bidder would have done. As the
firm's principal equity owner, management can benefit from such a double
cross because it will receive the resulting income gain. Unions and their
members can also defect if they can take their new ESOP shares and vote
them for the hostile bidder in return, for example, for wage or employment
guarantees. Such promises to labor might be made credible if the hostile
bidder promises labor adequate seats on the target's board or a board
supermajority provision, such as that which UAL proposed to adopt. 144 If
both players defect, the bidder will only need to give each token benefits
(such as a "golden parachute" to management and some minimal employ-
ment benefits to the union). On these assumed facts, the individual payoffs




Union Cooperate U=3, T=3 U=O, T=5
Defect U=5, T=-0 U'--1, T=1
tional relations). For an intellectual history of the Prisoner's Dilemma and an explanation of the
fascination it holds for social scientists, see Rapoport, Prisoner's'Dilemma-Recollections and Ob-
servations, in RATIONAL MAN AND IRRAUTONAL SocIETY 72-83 (B. Barry & R. Hardin ed. 1982).
143. See supra note 119.
144. See Salpukas, supra note 92, at 1, col. 5.
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Given this identical payoff structure, it is again better to defect than to coop-
erate, even though the collective payoff is higher from cooperation. In short,
what is collectively rational is individually irrational.
To this point, we have considered only a two-player game. Yet clearly
there are often multiple players, such as the three unions involved in the
UAL negotiations. Nonetheless, Russell Hardin has shown that the results
do not change when the game is expanded into an n-person game.145 One
can utilize the same matrix as before, but make the two players one individ-
ual versus the collective interest of all other members of the group. Thus, the
Prisoner A player could be the pilots' union, as before, and the Prisoner B
entries could represent the per capita payoffs to all other players (i.e., man-
agement and the other unions). Accordingly, even in a world of relatively
few players, we can expect individual actors to act in a way that is not collec-
tively rational, if the preconditions to the Prisoner's Dilemma are satisfied.
In fact, Mancur Olson's "collective action" problem can be understood as
simply an n-person Prisoner's Dilemma game.
But how realistic is the Prisoner's Dilemma to a world where the parties
can and do communicate? -In any example, the incentive to defect is heavily
dependent on the payoff structure, and even small differences in the foregoing
numbers can align the actors' self-interests and make it irrational not to co-
operate. But an even more important objection to the Prisoner's Dilemma
game exists: the game is by definition noncooperative. Some economists
have instead sought to model corporate governance as a cooperative game. 146
If we view corporate governance in this way, a determinate solution becomes
possible, which will often involve the unions and management forming a coa-
lition to thwart the hostile bidder (and thereby also denying shareholders the
takeover premium).1 47 Normally, the parties to an LBO can freely commu-
nicate. Unless there is an unusual restriction (such as a court order),
148 it
145. Hardin, Collective Action as an Agreeable n-Prisoner's Dilemma, 16 BEHAV. SC. 472, 479
(1971).
146. See M. AOKI, supra note 7. Aoki sees management as -basically a neutral referee, mediating
the claims of other constituencies. Id. at 61-63. 1 think this view ignores management's own very
real self-interests, and thus the fact that it too is an interested player in the game. Other economists,
however, have used the Prisoner's Dilemma format to model cooperation within the firm under
circumstances in which communication is possible but informal or implicit standards are likely to
govern behavior. See generally Leibenstein, supra note 7.
147. Polaroid's successful 1989 defense against a takeover bid is an apt illustration of this pat-
tern. See supra note 119. More generally, unions and management can seek antitakeover legislation
and frequently have done so in the context of a specific takeover. For the most recent such effort,
see Hylton, Pennsylvania To Toughen Bill To Thwart Takeovers, N.Y. Times, Mar. 28, 1990, at D6,
col. 5 (noting alliance of corporate executives and labor behind the bill). Indeed, one Pennsylvania
legislator commented: "What you'have are corporate executives who need protection coming up
here and saying to labor that they'll give them a piece of the action [if they help them deny share
holders their rights]." Id. (quoting State Senator Vincent J. Fumo).
148. See NWA; Inc. v. Davis, No. 4-88-298 (D. Mfnn.' Apr. 13, 1989).
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might seem that the Prisoner's Dilemma analogy is irrelevant. Yet, as the
closest students of game theory have recognized, the prerequisite to the Pris-
oner's Dilemma's applicability is not that the parties are unable to communi-
cate, but that they cannot make enforceable agreements with each other.
149
Thus, if the various sides in a complex negotiation over corporate control
cannot make credible commitments to each other, the Prisoner's Dilemma
may arise.
Still, is an inability to make credible commitments a realistic premise?
Sometimes cooperation may be unlikely because the parties do not trust each
other (here, the name Frank Lorenzo comes immediately to mind). But this
is an atypical situation. The greater problem is that the law may forbid en-
forceable agreements between unions and management that effectively deny
the shareholders their takeover premium. Thus, although the two sides can
communicate, they may not be able to agree in a legally enforceable way. As
a result, their practical ability to cooperate is likely to be determined by the
degree to which they either trust each other or can develop an institutional
mechanism that outflanks these legal barriers. For example, if management
simply hints that there will be fewer layoffs if it remains in power, this is a
nonenforceable promise from which management may later defect. If, how-
ever, management rewrites the collective bargaining agreement in the middle
of a takeover to make the promise enforceable, then this is precisely the case
in which the Air Line Pilots Association court held that Delaware corporate
law should control.150 Under Delaware law, the Unocal test would probably
apply, making the relevant question whether the board had acted "reason-
ably" in relation to a perceived "threat" to corporate interests.' 5' The para-
dox here is that the more enforceable and hence credible promise by
management to the unions becomes, the more it is also likely to breach man-
agement's fiduciary duties to its shareholders under Unocal.
149. See Harsanyi, Rationality Postulates for Bargaining Solutions in Cooperative and Non-Coop-
erative Games, 9 MANAG. SCi. 141, 143 (1952); see also Rapoport, supra note 142, at 80-81 (agree-
ing with Harsanyi that solution to noncooperative game is creation of enforceable agreements).
150. 874 F.2d 439, 447 (7th Cir. 1989).
151. Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 483 A.2d 946, 955 (Del. 1985). In addition, if the
corporation is deemed to be up for "sale" (which term typically includes a change of control),
Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 182 (Del. 1986), becomes
applicable. In Revlon, the Delaware Supreme Court held that when a corporation is "for sale," the
fiduciary role of the board shifts from that of a defender to that of an auctioneer charged with
obtaining the "best price" for its shareholders. Id. at 182. Revlon's holding prevents the board
from considering the interests of nonshareholder constituencies at the expense of shareholders. Id.
at 182-84 & n.16. Some decisions, however, do permit employee interests to be considered. See
GAF Corp. v. Union Carbide Corp., 624 F. Supp. 1016, 1019-20 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) (dictum) (as long
as board acts with honest, disinterested judgment in rejecting tender offer, it may also consider
interest of employer in preserving severance and pension benefits). The scope of the Unocal and
Revlon rules exceeds the parameters of this article. The relevant point here is only that they will
sometimes apply and thus will block coalitional agreements that come at shareholder expense.
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Nonetheless, if some forms of agreement are potentially blocked by state
corporate law, it does not follow that all are. One possibility is the use of an
ESOP, which the Polaroid decision may have legitimized as a takeover de-
fense tactic. 152 Yet here a different question surfaces about the enforceability
of the implicit bargain: can management assure itself that the ESOP stock
will be voted in its favor (i.e., that employees will not defect)? This question
poses significant problems, particularly because federal law may require that
the plan trustee vote the unallocated shares for the highest bidder. 153 If so,
defection may be mandated by federal law.
Fiduciary law has, however, an asymmetric effect on the ability of the par-
ties to form coalitions. Because fiduciary restrictions apply only to manage-
ment and the board, they do not restrict the ability of third party bidders to
offer a side payment to stakeholders (such as corporation's unions) to induce
them to back it in a corporate control contest.1 54 However, if management
attempts to do the same, such conduct, if detected, will probably be viewed
as a violation of Revlon's rule that managers in an auction must seek to maxi-
mize share value. 155 To this extent, the outside bidder may be able to engage
in a cooperative game with stakeholders, while management is restricted to a
noncooperative game (or at least one in which its signals must be heavily
veiled).
152. The Polaroid decision is discussed in more detail supra at note 119.
153. The Department of Labor's customary view of ERISA's fiduciary requirements has been
that the plan trustee or other applicable fiduciary must exercise tendering rights with respect to all
unallocated shares and also tender all allocated shares for which tendering instructions are not
received. See Letter from Alan D. Lebowitz, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Program Operations,
U.S. Dep't of Labor (Feb. 23, 1989), reprinted in 2 Merg. & Acq. L. Rep. (M & A) 426-27 (1989).
Although Internal Revenue Code § 409(e)(5) authorizes ESOPs to meet applicable voting require-
ments by authorizing the trustee to vote all plan shares in proportion to the voting instructions
received from plan participants on a one-participant/one-vote basis, this language says nothing
about whether plan participants may instruct the trustee as to whether to tender unallocated shares,
and at least one decision has required the fiduciary to use its independent discretion under the
ERISA "exclusive benefit" standard with respect to tendering the unallocated shares. See Danaher
Corp. v. Chicago Pneumatic Tool Co., 635 F. Supp. 246, 250 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) (ESOP trustee not
permitted to consider sole interests of current employee participants in tender decision). For an
overview of this confused area, see Nassau, Creating ESOPs in Leveraged Buyouts, 1 Merg. & Acq.
L. Rep. (M & A) 991, 997 (1989). In one recent case, an ESOP trustee sought and obtained a
declaratory judgment that he could ignore the voting and tendering pass-through provisions of the
ESOP and tender all shares owned by the ESOP, including the allocated shares. See Central Trust
Company, N.A. v. American Avents Corp., No. C-1-88-883, slip op. at 10-12 (S.D. Ohio May 26,
1989). This opinion may be limited by the special facts of the case because the inside directors
could have overturned the allocated ESOP shareholder's tender decision.
154. Although the bidder or other third parties are not subject to fiduciary duty limitations when
they do not stand in a fiduciary relationship to shareholders, they may sometimes be subject to
weaker limitations, such as the legal rules precluding tortious interference with contractual rights.
Courts have only begun to explore what restrictions, if any, are justified on this basis, See NWA,
Inc. v. Davis, No. 4-88-298 (D. Minn. Apr. 13, 1989).
155. See supra note 151.
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B. SOME APPLICATIONS: HOW WILL THE GAME PLAY OUT?
The foregoing discussion has viewed corporate governance as a multi-
player game that seems located somewhere on the seam between a coopera-
tive and noncooperative game, not fitting neatly into either category.156 If so,
what predictions, if any, can be made for the future? First, the players may
avoid fiduciary problems and structure credible mutual commitments by us-
ing one technique that is clearly available: a joint buyout that cashes out the
shareholders. Once shareholders are eliminated (at a competitive premium),
management, the unions, and any other equity bidder can then cut up the
residual equity pie in almost any way they want. Of course, this was pre-
cisely what the original UAL buyout attempted. Moreover, the insistence by
the pilots' union on a supermajority voting system shows that governance
provisions can be structured that do not permit subsequent defections. The
pilots' union effectively negotiated a veto power over those decisions most
likely to adversely affect them.15 7 In this light, the Prisoner's Dilemma need
not arise, because a joint buyout can involve explicit and enforceable govern-
ance provisions. Still, buyouts require the cooperation of multiple unions,
whose members may be in very different economic positions (as the pilots'
and machinists' unions at UAL). If only one union participates in the
buyout, the others will predictably resist wage concessions that earn no eq-
uity appreciation for them. In principle, however, it is not necessary that all
the free riders be "taxed" and bear their proportionate share of the costs and
wage concessions. Rather, when the potential gains or losses are significant
enough to a single actor, that actor should rationally be willing to bear a
disproportionate share (or even all) of the costs of collective action. 158 This
means that a single union (such as the pilots' union in the UAL example)
might be willing to bear more than its proportionate share of wage
concessions.
One more complication must be noted: both sides in this game can appeal
to outside third parties to join a coalition with them. Thus, it is never certain
how many players are in the game. Recent examples can be provided of both
156. Some theorists distinguish an intermediate category of "almost noncooperative" games in
which agreements are sometimes enforceable, but not when defection will yield a positive gain. See
J. HARSANYI, RATIONAL BEHAVIOR AND BARGAINING EQUILIBRIUM IN GAMES AND SOCIAL
SITUATIONS 273 (1977). Empirical research has also found that the appearance of a noncooperat-
ing outside player may cause an "implicit coalition" to form among other players. See Fader &
Hauser, Implicit Coalitions in a Generalized Prisoner's Dilemma, 32 J. CONFLICT RESOLUTION 553
(1988).
157. See supra text accompanying notes 103-105.
158. As Olson explained, if the benefits are large enough to a single member of the group, he may
be willing to bear all, or a disproportionate share, of the costs to avoid forfeiting these benefits. M.
OLSON, supra note 139, at 48-52. Olson defined a "privileged group" as a group with a dispropor-
tionately powerful member. Id. at 49-50. For an overview of some of Olson's conclusions, see
RATIONAL MAN AND IRRATIONAL SOCIETY 21-23 (B. Barry & R. Hardin ed. 1982).
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management and stakeholders finding such a third party ally. The best ex-
ample of a management coalition with an outside party is the recent
three-cornered battle between Time, Warner Communications, and Para-
mount Communications. 159 Faced with a hostile bid from Paramount,
Time's management restructured a friendly merger with Warner into a
friendly tender offer for the latter at an enhanced premium. Although the
Time-Warner proposed merger preceded and probably precipitated the Para-
mount bid, the fact remains that this conversion of an equity merger into a
cash tender offer blocked Paramount and also thwarted Time's shareholders.
Time's shareholders lost a lucrative premium, but Warner's shareholders ef-
fectively gained one, while Time's management avoided ouster. From a coal-
itional perspective, this resort to a third party (whether as a white knight or
as a target) can often amount in substance to a side payment by management
to the third party.16°
A corresponding example of a coalition between stakeholders and a third
party is provided by the recent agreement by UAL's unions to join with
Coniston Partners, an arbitrage firm, to wage a proxy fight to oust the UAL
board.161 According to press accounts, the coalition between Coniston and
the UAL unions has been effective because it frightened away other potential
bidders, who feared that if they were successful in outbidding the Coniston-
UAL offer, their victory would only trigger a strike by the unions. 162 If so,
such a coalition benefits both sides but comes at the cost of a higher premium
to shareholders.
Given that all of the major players in corporate governance can and have
entered into coalitions with and against each other, what form of coalition
should dominate? Employee buyouts have clearly increased and arguably
represent a cooperative solution in which all participants benefit. On closer
inspection, however, the issuance of shares to employees, particularly when
accomplished through the use of an ESOP, may simply block a hostile take-
over and involve little or no premium to shareholders.163 In such a case, the
buyout may be better viewed as a management-stakeholder coalition against
shareholders.
159. Paramount Communications, Inc. v. Time, Inc., Fed. See. L. Rep. (CC-) 94,938 (Del.
Sup. Feb. 26, 1990).
160. Warner employees, mostly senior executives, received $677 million in settlement of their
stock options and other rights as a result of the Time tender offer. See Hilder, supra note 5. This
can certainly be regarded as a side payment, although not an unlawful one, which would not have
accrued but for the Time tender offer.
161. See Salpukas, supra note 138.
162. Id. ("It is expected to be difficult for other buyers to match the offer made by Coniston and
the three unions because such a group would not have the benefit of wage and benefit concessions
the unions have pledged as part of the offer with Coniston.").




What response will such a strategy elicit from shareholders? The ability of
managers. and stakeholders to collude to lock free cash flow into the firm is
subject to one major caveat: because the gains to shareholders from LBOs
appear to be very high (over the short-run at least), shareholders may be able
to offer a higher price to either side. For example, in the UAL buyout, a
prominent takeover firm allied with UAL's unions to wage a proxy fight that
seeks to oust the board through a consent solicitation. 164 Conversely, one
can view the RJR Nabisco buyout as an alliance between management and
the shareholders to split the takeover gains at the expense of stakeholders.
Although management may have a greater psychological incentive to align
with stakeholders to resist a bidder, the bargaining need not logically pro-
duce such a coalition because shareholders may be able to offer greater eco-
nomic incentives. Put differently, the gains and losses are asymmetric, with
stockholders winning more from takeovers than bondholders and employees
lose.165 With these greater gains, stockholders can offer more to manage-
ment to align with them than stakeholders can rationally bid to avoid a take-
over. In a perfect Coasean world, one would expect that stakeholders and
stockholders would strike a bargain to realize these net gains, but in the real
world, transaction costs interfere (particularly in the case of publicly held
debt).
In short, if we start with the premise that stockholders gain more than
stakeholders lose in takeovers, then it follows that stockholders should be
able to win any auction that develops for management's loyalty. Of course,
shareholders today cannot actively organize, but they can acquiesce in (and
indeed encourage) an LBO bid from management.1 66 If management for
some reason resists, large stockholders may pressure them (as Coniston Part-
ners has done in the UAL episode) 167 with the threat that they will turn to
outside bidders. Yet, the LBO bid should be the preferred outcome because
rational shareholders should recognize that they cannot expect manage-
ment's acquiescence to a third-party bid. Because management can poten-
tially form a coalition with stakeholders to block any takeover, stockholders
need essentially to preempt the formation of such a coalition by outbidding
164. See Salpukas, supra note 107, at 33, col. 4.
165. Indeed, one study finds that even if bondholders in leveraged buyouts lost the entire book
value of their claims (an obviously unrealistic assumption), their losses would account for the share-
holders' gains from the same transactions in only 19 of 103 buyouts studied (or roughly 18%).
These authors conclude that bondholders generally face a maximum exposure of 10% of the book
value of their investments as a result of buyouts. See Marais, Schipper & Smith, supra note 65, at
182. This conclusion further supports the view that corporate governance should not be modeled as
a zero-sum game. See supra text accompanying note 147.
166. If management for some reason resists, bidders may be able to negotiate with some stake-
holders (such as the UAL unions) to oust management anyway (as Coniston Partners is threatening
to do).
167. See Salpukas, supra note 101.
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stakeholders in an auction for management's loyalty. Phrased differently,
third-party bids do not provide management with equivalent expected gains
to an LBO, and thus they are unlikely to secure management's loyalty. In
other words, because the maximum amounts that might be paid in golden
parachutes cannot possibly match the potential gains that the managements
of UAL or RJR Nabisco anticipated from their respective buyouts, this anal-
ysis does offer one testable prediction: LBO bids should dominate hostile
bids in the future, because they alone offer a feasible means for securing man-
agement's cooperation. In such a world, management has more incentive to
ally with stockholders than stakeholders.
Still, once the company is put in play, management cannot easily stop the
process. New bidders may surface, and management cannot know that it
will be on the winning side. In fact, the law restricts management in an LBO
much more than it restricts other bidders.168 Hence, if management is risk
averse, it may fear putting the company in play and prefer to side with stake-
holders. Thus, while management-shareholder coalitions seem more likely
than management-stakeholder coalitions (at least as long as hostile takeovers
remain feasible), neither should totally dominate the other, given manage-
ment's fear that it may lose control of events once it puts the company in
play (as happened in the RJR Nabisco buyout).
C. THE ITERATED PRISONER'S DILEMMA AND THE
EVOLUTION OF COOPERATION
In his now famous book, The Evolution of Cooperation, 169 Robert Axelrod
concludes that in actual practice the players in Prisoner's Dilemma games
quickly learn to cooperate. The strategy that he terms "TIT FOR TAT"
seems regularly to dominate; that is, rational actors learn to treat others as
they have been treated, cooperating if the other side has, defecting if they
have not.170 The persuasive force of Axelrod's book lies particularly in the
"real world" examples he gives of reciprocity and cooperation in actual so-
168. On the other hand, management may sometimes be able to enjoin the hostile bidder from
communicating with its unions. See supra notes 96-97 and accompanying text. For recent cases
that have enjoined what were essentially LBO transactions, see City Capital Assocs. v. Interco, Inc.,
551 A.2d 787, 798-800 (Del. Ch. 1988), appeal dismissed as moot, 556 A.2d 1070 (Del. 1989) (en-
joining board's failure to rddeem poison pill when bidder made noncoercive offer posing only
"mild" threat). See also Edelman v. Freuhauf Corp., 798 F.2d 882, 886-87 (6th Cir. 1986) (board
violated fiduciary duty under Michigan law in approving and assisting management-led buyout that
precluded competing bid for control through no-shop clause and other arrangements); cf. Hanson
Trust PLC v. MLSCM Acquisition, Inc., 781 F.2d 264, 282-83 (2d Cir. 1986) (enjoining target's
crown jewel lockup to LBO bidder).
169. See R. AXELROD, supra note 141.
170. Id. at 20.
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cial settings, even when opportunism is possible.171 In effect, his message is
that cooperative behavior is efficient; rational parties will come to learn this;
and through a survival-of-the-fittest type of competition, they will come to
dominate the field. 1
72
Does Axelrod's scenario apply to the triangular game of corporate govern-
ance that this article has been describing? The problem is that Axelrod was
describing an iterated Prisoner's Dilemma, in which the same game is played
over and over. In contrast, takeovers are seemingly one-shot affairs, at least
for management and employees. Because the game will not likely be re-
peated, a policy of reciprocity is impossible, and defection will therefore al-
ways seem the superior strategy. In a one-shot game, the bidder may believe
that it can break the prior implicit contract that management struck with
stakeholders and then bust up the firm, quickly liquidating its assets and not
having to manage them for long. Such a strategy makes sense if you are not
a repeat player and do not need to be trusted in the future by others. Cer-
tainly, some bidders-the Irving Jacobs, Paul Bilzerians, and Victor Posners
of this world-seem to be following just such a strategy of opportunism, by
in effect violating the prior tradition of ",TIT FOR TAT." On the other
hand, Frank Lorenzo's current predicament shows the downside in this strat-
egy. Lorenzo has united an alliance of stakeholders at Eastern Airlines
against him. 173 The real message of Lorenzo's predicament is that if one is a
repeat player, one cannot behave opportunistically without incurring
reprisals.
For most players, takeovers are a recurring game in which norms of reci-
procity can develop. Institutional investors, both as shareholders and bond-
holders, are clearly "repeat players." They do not "cut and run" with their
takeover profits as do small shareholders, who often spend their gains on
personal consumption, but rather they reinvest their gains in the market.
Also, institutional investors need to balance their gains as equity holders with
their exposure as bondholders, and they have little reason to encourage
wealth transfers that merely move money from one pocket to another. Even
for management, a takeover is not invariably a one-shot game. This article
earlier predicted that the LBO offer should dominate the hostile bid. If this
is true, an iterated game may be possible after all, because the same manage-
ment will remain in place, and a defection in one period will lead to a reprisal
171. Id. at 73-102 (examples from human warfare and the natural world indicate that friendship
and foresight are not necessary for "TIT FOR TAT" to function properly).
172. Id. at 22.
173. See Salpukas, supra note 98. Empirical research has found that in n-person games with one
noncooperative player, the other players may form an "implicit coalition" against that player. See
Fader & Hauser, supra note 156, at 560-62. This pattern could well describe the behavior of those
dealing with Mr. Lorenzo.
1990] 1543
THE GEORGETOWN LAW JOURNAL
by the other players in the next. To some degree, "TIT FOR TAT" may
therefore continue.
What would an "evolution toward cooperation" mean in this context?
Metropolitan Life's predicament in the RJR Nabisco buyout supplies an in-
structive example. Metropolitan Life's staff has estimated that it would have
cost Kohlberg, Kravis, Roberts & Co. (KKR) only "about $4 per share to
pay off bondholders" in the RJR buyout. 174 Thus, instead of paying share-
holders $109 per share for stock that had been trading at $55 a share at the
time of the buyout's announcement, KKR could have paid $105 to stock-
holders and also redeemed the bonds. Should they have done so? The usual
counterargument that bondholders accepted the risk of higher leverage by
not contracting against it seems particularly weak here, because purchasers
of investment grade securities elect to accept a low interest rate precisely to
avoid exposure to major risks. One cannot imagine Metropolitan Life ration-
ally accepting the interest penalty on investment grade debt while also know-
ingly accepting a loophole through which a regiment of lawyers could march
abreast to restructure the issuer. Thus, however Metropolitan Life's legal
rights are defined, 175 one has to assume that as a repeat player it would con-
sider such behavior opportunistic, and in a game of "TIT FOR TAT" would
seek reprisals.
It seems clear that institutional investors are not organizing in this fashion,
at least yet. Possibly, this shows that (1) takeovers are not a repeat game, (2)
relevant reprisals are not possible (at least by bondholders), (3) the losses are
sufficiently small that a response is not cost justified (possibly because institu-
tional investors are sufficiently diversified so that their gains as stockholders
outweigh their losses as bondholders), 176 or (4) the market regards "event
risk" as an exogenous new development, which no one exploited opportunis-
tically, and which new contractual protections (i.e., the "poison put") resolve
for the future. All these interpretations are possible, but it is worth inquiring
in the concluding section of this article how corporate governance would
change if the principal participants-stockholders and management-did see
themselves locked into a repeat game. Whether or not true today, this may
prove to be a valid scenario for the future.
174. See Franklin, Met Life Looks for Help, N.Y.L.J., May 11, 1989, at 5, col. 5.
175. See supra notes 37-53 and accompanying text.
176. If institutional.investors were perfectly diversified between bonds and stocks, they would be
indifferent to wealth, transfers. This is a very unrealistic assumption, although for some institutional
investors the significance of wealth transfers will be offset to the degree that they are largely diversi-
fied between bonds and stocks. Moreover, even the perfectly diversified investor would object to
incurring transaction costs to produce wealth transfers that yield no real gains. In any event, the
rapid appearance and use of poison puts and Standard & Poor's development of an event risk rank-
ing system for negative covenants suggests strongly that institutional investors are not indifferent to
event risk and hence not fully diversified with respect to it. For evidence of significant losses to




This article has raised two central contentions. First, at least a modest
paradigm shift is needed: we should move from viewing the public corpora-
tion as a "series of bargains" to recognizing that it is also a "series of coali-
tions." One need not deny that contracting within the firm is possible (and
indeed will cover most contingencies) to realize that economists have tended
to reify the word "contract" and use it to cover relationships in which the
parties have expectations, but not enforceable rights. The truth is that long-
term relational contracts, such as the corporation, are almost inevitably in-
complete. Risks not perceived at the outset of the relationship grow and
mature until one of the participants realizes that it is seriously exposed to
loss. At this juncture, its response may be to rely not on contract, but on
coalition. That is, if it cannot secure a favorable contract modification, it
may seek to form an alliance with another party who is also exposed (to the
same or other risks) in order to protect their mutual interests. Coalition for-
mation is then an alternative mode of protecting expectations, and typically
an ex post one, but it coexists with contracting, and one cannot explain the
internal relationships within the firm without discussing both mechanisms.
Second, within the context in which coalitions operate, a game theory per-
spective has greater explanatory power than the equilibrium-oriented per-
spective of financial economics. The basic message of a game theory
perspective on corporate governance is that the parties may make choices
that yield individually rational, but collectively irrational, outcomes. Above
all, what the Prisoner's Dilemma teaches is that circumstances can arise in
which cooperation is unlikely and guileful defections are predictable. The
difficulty experienced by the parties to the UAL buyout in reaching any con-
sensus despite their common interests suggests that at least sometimes theory
and practice can coincide.
This conclusion that rationality will not automatically prevail might seem
to be a prelude to stating the case for closer regulation. But there is a flip
side to this pessimistic picture: to the extent that the Prisoner's Dilemma
becomes an iterated game, the likelihood of these outcomes reverses, and
cooperation becomes the predictable strategy of successful repeat players.
177
Further, to the extent that a game can be converted from a noncooperative
one to a cooperative one, an efficient solution is almost always possible.178
This analysis frames an empirical question: should takeovers be viewed as
177. For an overview, see RATIONAL MAN AND IRRATIONAL SOCIETY, supra note 158, at 33-34.
178. See J. HARSANYI, supra note 156, at 289 ("[I]n a cooperative game, it is almost always
possible for rational players to reach an efficient (Pareto-optimal) outcome."). If we assume that
the game is cooperative, there is a rich literature on how coalition formation is likely to proceed.
For an excellent overview, see H. RAIFFA, THE ART AND SCIENCE OF NEGOTIATION 257-74
(1983). Precise, determinate solutions do hot, however, always result.
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single-shot affairs or are they in some respects repeat player games in which
cooperation can evolve? The answer must be a mixed and qualified one. For
management and employees, who have by definition only one job, takeovers
are indeed more likely to be one-shot affairs. But for shareholders and bond-
holders, the answer seems less clear. Speculative as it is to guess whether
reciprocity will dominate opportunism, plausible reasons exist to believe that
as share ownership becomes more "institutionalized" (that is, as institutions
increasingly dominate the market and hold the majority of the stock in pub-
licly held firms), the possibility of an "evolution toward cooperation" will
grow. As recognizable repeat players, institutional investors may become
more constrained than other stockholders in their ability to cooperate with
opportunistic bidders. The key difference between their present position and
that which they are likely to have in the near future is that they may soon
lose their relative anonymity. Consider a hypothetical case in which a bidder
wishes to behave opportunistically by acquiring a firm to breach implicit con-
tracts with its stakeholders. 179 Today, such a bidder may incur some reputa-
tional loss (assuming that it has any reputational capital to lose), but the
shareholders who tender to it do not, because they may do so with relative
anonymity. Arguably, they have aided and abetted the bidder's opportu-
nism, but their complicity has been masked by their anonymity.
In the future, however, that anonymity may fade, as it appears likely that
eventually one hundred or fewer institutions will hold the majority of the
stock in many publicly traded firms. 180 Perhaps we will soon see the day
when twenty-five or so large institutional investors, each holding one to three
percent, will hold de facto working control among them and will then be able
easily to communicate and achieve a joint strategy.' 81 Such institutionally
179. See Shleifer & Summers, supra note 9, for the most complete statement of the theory that an
investor could engage in a wealth-transferring takeover that profits by breaching prior implicit
contracts.
180. A survey by the Investor Responsibility Research Center (IRRC) of actively traded firms on
the New York Stock Exchange found that institutions hold a majority of the shares of 40% of the
firms. Institutions hold more than 40% of the shares of 60% of the firms. In these institutionally
dominated firms, a limited number of institutions may own a majority of the stock. In roughly 23%
of the NYSE-listed firms that were majority-owned by institutions, fewer than 100 institutions held
the majority, and in another 34% of these firms, between 101 and 200 institutions held the majority.
See Conard, Fiduciary Obligations of the Asset Manager, in PROXY VOTING OF PENSION PLAN
EQUITY SECURITIES 86, 90-93 (P. McGill ed. 1989) (copy on file at The Georgetown Law Journal).
Hence, if these trends continue, it appears likely that there will be a significant number of publicly
held corporations in which fewer than 100 institutions hold an absolute majority (and in which
perhaps 20 hold de facto working control). Of course, it is also possible that institutions will seek to
avoid this structure of share ownership precisely because they do not wish to lose their anonymity
(and perhaps wish to behave opportunistically).
181. Recent surveys have found that institutional investors owned 42.7% of all corporate equi-
ties as of 1986, as compared with 38.5% in 1981. See C. BRAftCATO & P. GAUGHAN, THE
GROWTH OF INSTITUTIONAL INVESTORS IN U.S. CAPITAL MARKETS 13 (Columbia Law School
Institutional Investor Project, Nov. 1988) (copy on file at The Georgetown Law Journal). Even
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dominated corporations will be the most susceptible targets for takeovers,
because institutions will be able effectively to resist antitakeover measures
and solve the collective action problems that confound other shareholders.
But, as the number of shareholders drops, so does their anonymity and thus
their ability to behave opportunistically by breaching implicit contracts.
The relative loss of anonymity appears inevitable. Some estimates today
place the stock ownership of the fifty largest institutional holders at twenty-
seven percent of the total capitalization of the Wilshire 5000 Index (the com-
prehensive list of all domestic equities).18 2 The thirteen largest institutions
appear to hold more than half this amount. The great irony here is that the
problem of collective action, upon which all pessimistic estimates of the fu-
ture of corporate governance have rested since the time of Berle and Means a
half-century ago, may be quietly fading in significance.
How will a small body of institutions, each owning two to three percent
and sharing de facto control, behave? As they become identifiable to the
stakeholders, it seems likely that they will also become more politically ac-
countable. Indeed, to the extent that creditors are also institutions, greater
direct communication among creditors and shareholders seems likely. This
prediction does not imply that there will not be more takeovers, but only that
their wealth-transfer aspects will become more vulnerable. "TIT FOR
TAT" will become more feasible as a game, and perhaps ultimately inevita-
ble once twenty-five shareholders or so hold control and must deal with a
dozen or so large creditors and unions. Of course, at this point one is no
longer describing a public corporation, but some new hybrid of public and
institutional ownership. That day may be gradually dawning.
One alternative must be cautiously noted. Institutional investors could de-
liberately refrain from acquiring de facto control precisely to avoid visibility
and political accountability. The trend toward ownership concentration may
come to a halt at or about its current level because the costs of losing ano-
nymity could exceed the benefits of reduced agency costs.
This article's focus on coalition formation inevitably requires that it face a
normative issue in closing. Are not such coalitions between management and
stakeholders nothing more than thinly veiled efforts at collusion that deprive
shareholders of their right to management's loyalty as a fiduciary? Undoubt-
edly, collusion and coalition can be synonyms. But a narrow preoccupation
these numbers understate reality because the commonly used definition of "institution" excludes
many financial institutions such as investment banks and savings and loan associations.
182. According to The Institutional Investor, the 50 largest institutional holders of equity securi-
ties held $736 billion in stocks at the end of 1988. See The Institutional Investor 300: Ranking
America's Top Money Managers, INSTITUTIONAL INVESTOR, July 1989, at 121, 161. This number
amounts to 27% of the Wilshire 5000 level of $2,738 billion at December 31, 1988. This calculation
was pointed out to me by my Columbia colleague, Professor Bernard Black.
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with fiduciary duties has long been the hobgoblin of law professors. A fuller
normative theory must recognize the possibility that stakeholders can also
experience injury and are unable to contract so as to protect themselves from
all risks. The recent experience of bondholders in takeovers illustrates this
exposure. If the law were to approach all issues of corporate governance
with a single-minded devotion to fiduciary duties, it would facilitate wealth
transfers from stakeholders to stockholders. While these transfers are not
the cause of takeovers, they are a byproduct.18 3
From what starting point should a normative theory begin? In my view,
we need to recognize that takeovers are efficient only in the Kaldor/Hicks
sense of that term and not in the Pareto sense.18 4 The Kaldor/Hicks defini-
tion of efficiency is that the gains exceed the losses. The best evidence now
available suggests that this criterion is satisfied.18 5 However, Pareto effi-
ciency requires that some be made better off, while no one is made worse off.
Clearly, that standard is not satisfied. Pareto efficiency may seem an impos-
sible standard to meet, because some losers usually result from any important
economic, social, or historical transition.
Nonetheless, social policy should seek to move us from Kaldor/Hicks effi-
ciency to Pareto efficiency with respect to the impact of takeovers. Why?
The short answer is that no other position is politically tenable. Because the
"losers" in takeovers-employees, managers, local communities, and suppli-
ers-tend to be politically concentrated in the same jurisdiction as the target,
while the "winners" (i.e., shareholders) are dispersed nationally, a regulatory
mismatch is created. Local coalitions form between target managements and
stakeholders that seek antitakeover statutes. Such coalitions are demonstra-
bly effective, and externalities* result. But this process is inevitable, because
the losers outnumber the winners (both locally and nationally), as sharehold-
ers are relatively few in number in comparison to stakeholders. If takeovers
are to persist, the most sensible social policy is to make them Pareto efficient,
if only to keep them politically viable.
How legislation might force the winners to compensate the losers is the
topic for another article, but the immediate point is that Pareto efficiency
would not require the winners to sacrifice much of their gains.' 8 6 Pending
such a legislative resolution, coalitions of management and stakeholders pro-
183. See supra notes 78-82 and accompanying text.
184. The Kaldor/Hicks approach to efficiency postulates that if the gains exceed the losses, the
transaction is efficient because either society or the winners can compensate the losers. See A.
POLINSKY, AN INTRODUcTION TO LAW AND ECONOMICS 7-10, 115-17 (1983); Hicks, The Founda-
tion of Welfare Economics, 49 EcoN. J. 696 (1939).
185. For evidence that the gains to shareholders are enormous, see the sources cited supra note
10. One recent study finds bondholder losses to equal only 3.3% of shareholder gains from take-
overs. See supra note 81.
186. See supra notes 81 & 174 and accompanying text.
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vide a mediating force that keeps opposition to takeovers from becoming
even more intense. LBO's and employee takeovers yield very large gains to
shareholders (although possibly somewhat less than a regime of unrestricted
hostile bids would), but such a "free market" regime of unrestricted take-
overs would lack political viability.
By no means do I suggest that all coalitions between management and
stakeholders be accepted; nor would I even suggest a judicial rule of benign
neglect. Still, coalition formation and coalition decay are facts of corporate
life. For the time being, it is best that we understand-them better before we
decide how to regulate them.
